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Executive Summary 
This report summarizes preliminary results from the Farm Behavior component of the 
South Tobacco Creek Integrated Modeling Project (STC Project) which is being undertaken as 
part of the Watershed Evaluation of BMPs (WEBs) Program. WEBS is a partnership between 
Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (AAFC) and Ducks Unlimited Canada (DUC) established to 
evaluate the economic and environmental performance of BMPs for water quality at the 
watershed scale.  
Water draining from South Tobacco Creek eventually enters to Lake Winnipeg which is 
degraded from the cumulative effects of nutrient loading, particularly phosphorous. Many 
jurisdictions across the world, including Canada, use payments programs to encourage land 
owners to change land management practices in order to reduce non-point source pollution. BMP 
incentive programs in Canada, such as Greencover, rely on fixed payment schemes which pay 
producers a set amount for BMPs, regardless of costs or benefits. In order to improve the 
performance of payment programs many jurisdictions have instituted auction type mechanisms. 
The purpose of the Farm Behavior component of the STC project is to examine the performance 
of various types of payment programs for BMPs relative to reducing phosphorous loads from 
STC.   
Theoretical and empirical evidence from conservation auctions suggest that the 
performance of auctions depends on several factors which affect the bidding behavior of 
producers during the auction, and therefore the cost-effectiveness of auctions over other types of 
payment programs. In particular, some producers actually benefit from BMPs, however under 
certain auction rules these producers would be paid the same amount as high cost producers; 
alternatively, producers with low costs of adopting BMPs may not always provide the greatest 
benefits in terms of pollution abatement depending on their location in the watershed, and 
physical features of their land.  
We assessed the relative performance of different payment programs by developing 
producer response functions for adoption of Beneficial Management Practices (BMPs). Producer 
adoption responses under different incentive schemes were tested using experiments with student 
subjects and limited trials with producers. We examined four BMPs: construction of holding 
ponds, riparian management, forage conversion, and conservation till. The results of the adoption   4 
response experiments conducted under WEBS were used to draw preliminary observations on 
BMP policy design and form the basis for recommendations for further research.  
The farm behavior project focuses on addressing the following two questions: 
1.  Does BMP adoption at a given farm make the individual farm household better or worse 
off from an economic perspective? 
2.  How much will it cost the government to get farms to adopt BMPs under different 
payment programs?  
 
Since producer heterogeneity is key to understanding the performance of conservation 
auctions, we examined the costs and benefits of BMPs at the individual farm level and developed 
on-farm costs for each BMP for each producer in the watershed. The basic components of the 
model are described below, however the details including underlying assumptions regarding 
baseline farm behavior, are outlined within the body of the report. We used the on-farm cost 
model to generate aggregate cost functions for BMPs for the watershed and to parameterize the 
policy experiments related to conservation auctions.  
 
Preliminary estimates of environmental benefits of individual BMP adoption were provided 
by Dr. Wanhong Yang using results from a SWAT model developed under a separate component 
of the South Tobacco Creek WEBS project. Based on this information, we were able to evaluate 
the performance of various auction formats in terms of cost effectiveness, distribution of 
payments amongst producers, and environmental benefit. 
The results from the Farm behavior component of the South Tobacco Creek project are 
preliminary, and are currently being refined. Therefore it is difficult to draw generalized 
conclusions at this point. Further experiments are being conducted to complete the data 
collection during FY 08-09 through Interim WEBS funding. Nonetheless main findings to date 
are summarized below: 
1.  The four BMPs assessed differ in terms of their cost as well as their ability to deliver 
environmental benefits. Unfortunately, there is no BMP that dominates across farms at all 
abatement levels. Farms have heterogeneous costs in terms of BMPs, and some farms are 
cost effective at supplying abatement using one BMP, but not another.    5 
2.  This suggests that if water quality benefits (e.g. phosphorous reduction) can be quantified 
through modeling by BMP and by farm, then water quality should be the contracting unit 
for the auction rather than the BMP. This would allow producers to select the most cost 
effective BMP for supplying water quality benefits, and then decision makers could 
allocate contracts based on ranking the costs of abatement.  
3.  At the next stage of the research we will test for synergies between farms – ie., whether 
the joint production function for water quality between farms differs from the sum of 
individual production functions. This will have implications for how the payment scheme 
should be designed. 
4.  Incorporating „fairness‟ types of allocation rules for conservation dollars, such as 
maximum participation in conservation programs is inefficient in terms of cost and 
environmental benefits. If fairness, or using conservation payments as a form of 
extension to learn about on farm costs of BMPs is the goal of the auction, then fixed 
payment programs which are open to everyone may be more desirable. 
5.  The performance of the auction depends on the shape of the cost function for BMPs 
and/or pollution abatement, as well as whether uniform (pay everyone the highest bid) or 
discriminatory pricing (pay everyone their own bid) rules are applied. In future research 
we will be investigating to what extent we can generalize results about the performance 
of uniform versus discriminatory pricing rules in this context. 
  
In conclusion, this research has allowed us to investigate individually the performance of 
incentive payments for individual BMPs. The results of the analysis provide us with a baseline of 
information by which we can begin to assess more complex conservation program issues, such as 
how to optimally select multiple BMPs within the watershed, and whether/how to spatially target 
BMPs.  
On-Farm Costs and Benefits of BMPs 
On-farm net costs of BMPs include direct costs (capital outlay and subsequent maintenance) 
and indirect or opportunity costs related to foregone revenues from business as usual. Benefits of 
BMP adoption include improvements in soil structure, texture, and nutrient availability. The 
methodology for estimating BMP follows four steps: 
(1) Estimating baseline or business as usual farm income (the opportunity cost);   6 
(2) Estimating changes in yields and costs for BMPs; 
(3) Projecting yields, revenues, and costs for assumed BMP for period 2006-18;  
(4) Calculating net farm income for the projection period. 
 
 
The crop yield models revealed that the role of farm specific variables such as land quality 
and individual producer management techniques is in general large and statistically significant, 
suggesting significant BMP cost heterogeneity. Table 1 summarizes total adoption costs for each 
BMP, assuming that all producers in the watershed adopt. The final column of Table 1 
summarizes the total budget we estimate is available to producers in South Tobacco Creek based 
on existing Farm Stewardship Program payment levels. The two columns together show that 
there is a significant budget shortfall if the goal is 100% BMP adoption in the watershed. 
Findings on BMP specific costs are outlined below: 
 
Zero Tillage 
Zero tillage has a positive impact on wheat yield but negative impacts on yields for 
canola, and oats. The effect of zero tillage on barley and flax was not statistically significant; 
Zero tillage increases the cost of production for wheat. The combined effect of adopting zero 
tillage for crop yield and crop production costs is captured through a net income model, which 
shows that adopting zero tillage increases net income for wheat but decreases net income for 
barley, oats, flax and canola. The combined effect over the rotation is that increasing the level of 
adoption of zero tillage in the watershed will be costly. Furthermore, producers in the watershed 




Forage yields and revenues increase with the amount of time forages are in the ground. 
At the same time, costs of forages decrease over time, although the reasons for this are not 
immediately clear. One reason could be that forage needs less fertilizer over time, However the 
decline in fertilizer use with time is not statistically significant. Indirect benefits of forage 
production come from improved soil nutrients. When combined with increased use of nitrogen in 
subsequent crop rotations, forages led to a future „yield boost‟ for wheat and canola crops of   7 
approximately 1.5 lbs/ac and 0.9 lbs/ac, respectively. Owning cattle significantly improved 
incomes on forage lands, possibly because cattle return forage nutrients to the soil. In terms of 
land characteristics, slope seemed to have a positive effect on income and a negative effect on 
cost of adopting forages – possibly because soils on slopes were less likely to be water logged. 
Overall increased forage conversion was costly for every producer, ranging from $7/acre/10 
years to $608/acre/10 years. In addition there was greater variation in costs of forages than costs 
of zero tillage.  
 
Riparian Management 
Riparian management costs include costs of off-site watering devices and fencing, as well 
as opportunity costs associated with lost crop production. In total, six producers in the watershed 
had land that was eligible for riparian management. Costs of increasing the number of areas 
under riparian management increase linearly in the sample, suggesting that fencing costs and off-
site watering costs overwhelm the variability associated with lost farm income from not cropping 
the riparian area. Riparian management costs range from $16,603/field/10years for a 16 acre 
field to $98,000/field/10years for a 100 acre field. Lack of heterogeneity suggests that riparian 
management is not a good candidate for using an auction as a price discovery mechanism. 
Instead payments based on observable fencing and watering trough costs should be considered. 




There are currently 12 livestock producers in the watershed who could adopt holding 
ponds. Suitable locations for holding ponds were identified based on drainage area. The number 
of head of livestock was used to determine the required volume of excavation.  The first six 
producers would require a total payment of close to $20,000 to fully cover the costs of 
excavation. Preliminary analysis of abatement costs for the holding pond BMP show a greater 
degree of heterogeneity in the costs per unit abatement versus the costs per head of livestock. 
The heterogeneity is related to the physical features of the farm landscape as well as the different 
production practices and operations on each farm. In addition, the ranking of producers in terms   8 
of costs per unit of pollution abatement is completely different than for costs per unit of 
livestock.  
 
Summary of Estimated Total Costs of BMP Adoption for South Tobacco Creek. 
BMP  Number of 
Eligible Producers 
in STC 
Estimated Total Costs   
(10 year contracts) 
Government Budget 
(National Farm Stewardship 
Payments) 
Riparian mgmt.  6  $294,884  $100,434 
Holding ponds  12  $112,462  $56,231 (~$57/head) 
Zero-till  36  $1,444,175   $433,253  (~$94/acre) 
Forage 
conversion 
36  $2,860,727  $858,218 (~$62/acre) 
 
Adoption Rates of BMPs 
Government programs for encouraging adoption of BMPs include education and 
awareness, appealing to stewardship motives, and cost sharing arrangements with producers 
based on fixed prices for practices. However, since producer costs for BMPs are heterogeneous, 
high cost producers tend to not participate in these programs, even if their contribution to 
pollution abatement might be significant. Furthermore, current uptake for at least some BMPs in 
Canada is low, suggesting greater incentives are required. The ultimate costs and benefits of 
conservation payment programs depend not only on private costs and benefits of BMPs that 
accrue to producers, but also on the way in which incentive payment programs are implemented. 
Based on Farm Stewardship Program schedules for fixed payment programs, we can see that 
there is a large gap between the amount of money available for BMPs through government 
programs and the cost to producers.  
In order to allocate conservation budgets more efficiently, many jurisdictions have 
experimented with reverse auctions for conservation contracts (e.g. Bush Tender, Australia; 
Conservation Reserve Program, USDA). Auctions encourage producers to reveal private 
information about the costs of BMP adoption which can be used to improve performance of   9 
conservation programs. The performance of auctions is sensitive to the problem context and 
varies according to auction design features. We tested auction design features for three BMPs: 
zero tillage, forage conversion, and holding ponds. The design options tested in our experiments 
are summarized in Table 2.  
Summary of Experimental Testing of Auction Design Rules 
Auction 
Goal 
Ranking Rule  Holding Pond  Zero Till  Forage 
Budget 
based 
Max Participation  2 Uniform, 2 
Disc 
     
Max Coverage  2 Uniform, 2 
Disc 
2 Uniform , 2 
Disc 
2 Uniform , 2 
Disc 
Max EBI
1  2 Uniform, 2 
Disc 
     
Target  
Based 
Max Coverage  2 Uniform, 2 
Disc 
     
Max EBI  2 Uniform , 2 
Disc 
     
1 EBI refers to the environmental benefits index, which in this case is maximizing phosphorus abatement. 
Goal of the Auction 
Auctions may have different objectives. On the one hand the goal of an auction may be to 
maximize environmental benefits of BMP payments given a target budget. However an 
alternative goal may be to minimize the costs of meeting a fixed environmental target. Different 
goals can affect the performance of the auction. The advantage of a budget constrained auction is 
that the program‟s cost is well-known in advance, there are no financial surprises and it can be 
easily planned. However, there is uncertainty about the level of environmental quality 
improvements that can be achieved with the budget based approach. The advantage with the 
target based approach is that there is more certainty about environmental quality, however costs 
are uncertain. In addition, producers can use assumptions about environmental quality goals to 
„game‟ the auction. 
   10 
Bid Selection Criteria 
Bid selection criteria are the specific rules which are used to rank winners. Three bid 
selection rules were tested. Maximum Environmental Benefit (performance based) rules rank 
offers based on the maximum level of phosphorous abated per dollar. Unfortunately while this is 
the most cost effective way to meet an environmental target, it requires knowledge of abatement 
levels by field and farm, which is often not available to the decision maker. Also, the efficiency 
goal of the auction may be in conflict with the social goal of the auction which is to increase 
learning and participation in programs. Maximum Coverage (activity based) ranking rules are 
used as a proxy for abatement when performance can‟t be measured directly. In this case 
programs are ranked according to the number of hectares (or alternative units) under a specific 
BMP. Finally, Maximum Participation rules rank offers based on the number of producers that 
adopt the BMP for a given budget.  Note that many payment programs, including the Canadian 
farm stewardship program, focus on participation levels of producers as a measure of “success”; 
 
Payment Format 
The payment format specifies whether everyone receives the same payment per BMP. 
Under uniform payments everybody receives the amount of the cutoff (highest cost) bid while 
under discriminatory payments everybody receives the amount of their own bid. These two 
payment formats affect the cost and political acceptability of auctions. 
 
Criteria for Evaluating Results 
Economic efficiency is the cost of abatement per unit of pollution.  At the time of the 
experiments we only had abatement levels for the holding pond BMP so we were able to 
calculate this measure for all treatments employed for this BMP, but not for any others. This 
work is slated to be completed during the Interim WEBS project year, 2008-09. Dr. Yang‟s 
hydrologic model provided abatement levels of phosphorus, nitrogen and sediment. For the 
holding pond BMP these pollutants were highly correlated and linearly related. So we focused on 
efficiency in terms of cost per kg of phosphorus abated since phosphorus is a pollutant of   11 
significant interest in Manitoba.
2 We also report on the total amount paid to winning bidders 
above what their actual costs were. The surplus of payments over costs is referred to as an 
information “rent” which accrues to some producers who have better information about their 
costs than the government. Finally, we evaluate the auction formats based on the environmental 
benefit, measured as the level of phosphorous abatement where information was available. We 
refer to this abatement performance as EBI (environmental benefit index). 
 
A priori, we expected that under the max participation strategy more producers would 
“win” the auction, while the max EBI approach would result in fewer winners than either of the 
other two ranking strategies.  The max participation strategy with the uniform price rule was 
expected to yield the highest portion of rent. Indeed under the uniform pricing rule, a 
considerable portion of the total payment is rent, since producers receive the highest payment. It 
was not possible to calculate baseline rents for discriminatory pricing rules for this study. 
 
Results 
  The maximum EBI strategy clearly performs the best in terms of overall abatement. The 
discriminative pricing approach generated slightly less abatement compared to the uniform 
pricing strategy. However this finding is based on two experimental trials using each pricing 
rule, so we are reluctant to draw firm conclusions regarding the pricing rule design at this 
stage of our research.  
 
  The maximum participation strategy performed quite poorly in terms of cost for both uniform 
and discriminatory pricing rules. This coupled with its overall lower level of abatement 
achieved suggests that it is not a good candidate for designing auctions for pollution 
abatement unless the goal is educational, or if the government is willing to pay a high 
premium to achieve other social objectives related to increased participation. We conclude 
from these findings that the maximum participation approach to selecting offers is clearly not 
a cost effective strategy for abating pollution in this watershed. 
 
                                                 
2 This was also mentioned to us in meetings with WEBs management staff in Edmonton in August 2007.   12 
  The maximum coverage approach performs significantly better than the maximum 
participation approach and was a reasonable approach for auction design when performance 
based information is unavailable.  The maximum coverage approach is much closer to 
meeting EBI in terms of costs. 
 
  Preliminary evidence suggests that average costs of auctions per unit of activity, as well as by 
amount of abatement seem to vary depending on whether the auction uses uniform or 
discriminative pricing rules. The performance of one pricing rule over the other seems to 
depend on the shape of the cost function, and on the number of participants in the auction. 
Further research is required to fully understand the relationship between the shape of BMP 
cost functions and the performance of uniform versus discriminatory pricing. 
 
  In the laboratory we examined the potential difference between fixed budget and fixed target 
auctions for the holding pond BMP. The results suggest that the budget constrained auction 
results in more cost effective conservation with uniform pricing rather than discriminatory 
pricing rules. However, our results are preliminary pending further rounds of experiments to 
confirm our findings.  
 
  We were fortunate to be able to attend the 2008 Annual Meeting of the Deerwood Soil and 
Water Association on March 10, 2008.  At this meeting we were permitted to bring our 
laboratory and host three sessions of experiments with producers and several other 
participants. These sessions were not strictly the same as those we ran at the University of 
Alberta with students as it was impossible to tightly control the conditions. The final auction 
conducted during this meeting provided some interesting, if non-conclusive results. In 
particular, prices converged to the expected price for both the students and the producers, 
mirroring similar comparative findings emerging from Australian and US research. 
 
Implications for Future Research 
  Our auctions to date have involved single BMPs. While this was necessary given the 
information we had and the need to establish policy baselines it is apparent that the combined 
effect of BMPs on producer costs and cost effective environmental improvements must be   13 
considered in future experiments. In other jurisdictions producers face a “menu” of BMPs 
and select one or more from this list given the available incentives. In order for this to occur 
we first need to develop an overall abatement supply function for the STC watershed 
possibly including more BMPs such as wetland retention and restoration.  Continuing on this 
vein, spatially explicit models of BMP adoption should be considered. Spatial optimization 
model can be used to develop auction targets. In considering auctions in this framework, 
“smart markets”, where an optimization model is included in each auction round to select 
winning offers, should be considered. 
 
  The experiments conducted to date have not allowed communication among the players. This 
is obviously an unrealistic situation as producers often share extension information, and are 
also likely to share information about the auction. This could undermine the competitiveness 
of the auction. In addition, policy options should be expanded to test could include some 
group incentives. Watershed associations are growing in number in Canada and devolving 
some responsibility for pollution abatement to the local level may be worthy of examination. 
In future we propose to examine group payment strategies and to understand how to develop 
auctions to reduce opportunities for players to collude (or to collude for environmental 
benefit).  
 
  This research has allowed us to examine experimental approaches for evaluating auction 
design, and understand their strengths and weaknesses. As a result of this work we have 
developed a mobile experimental computer laboratory that we tested at the Deerwood annual 
meeting. We think that further experiments with producers need to occur, and having this lab 
will greatly facilitate this endeavor. 
 
  Auctions for conservation contracts are appealing because they capture private information 
about individual costs to producers of BMP adoption. However while heterogeneity of 
producer costs make auctions attractive, at the same time this heterogeneity affects the 
performance of auctions under different types of auction formats and rules.  Therefore it is 
important to „test bed‟ auctions for specific applications prior to policy implementation.    14 
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Introduction 
Greencover and other conservation programs established under the environmental 
component of the Agricultural Policy Framework (APF), are currently being implemented on the 
agricultural landscapes of Canada. These programs have been introduced to mitigate the adverse 
environmental effects of agricultural production. Unlike the United States and the European 
Union, conservation programs in Canada typically do not provide financial incentives to farmers 
for implementing beneficial management practices or conserving land and ecosystem services. 
The approach currently being considered in Canada involves the development of beneficial 
management practices (BMPs) with an understanding that these BMPs will be adopted by 
farmers under various incentive schemes. 
 
Under the Federal Provincial Farm Stewardship Programs, a BMP is defined as an 
agricultural management practice which ensures the long-term health and sustainability of land-
related resources used for agricultural production; positively impacts the long-term economic 
and environmental viability of the agricultural industry; and minimizes negative impacts and risk 
to the environment.  
 
The Watershed Evaluation of BMPs (WEBs) project is a partnership between Agriculture 
and Agri-Food Canada (AAFC) and Ducks Unlimited Canada (DUC) established to evaluate the 
economic and environmental performance of BMPs for water quality at the watershed scale. To 
date the effectiveness of BMPs has been tested primarily on plots or small fields, with results 
extrapolated to watersheds. But plot and field tests might not accurately predict watershed effects 
due to confounding spatial factors, and cumulative effects. The WEBs project selected seven 
representative sub-watersheds (i.e. micro-watersheds in the range of 300 ha) to implement 
BMPs, establish monitoring stations, and collect water quality and socioeconomic data 
associated with adoption of BMPs. We think that some of the specific questions that should be 
addressed under WEBS are as follows: 
1.  Does BMP adoption at a given farm significantly change the farm‟s output of point and 
non-point pollution? 
2.  Does BMP adoption at a given farm make the individual farm household better or worse 
off from an economic perspective?   18 
3.  In the regional watershed what is the current contribution of each farm to the total 
pollution load and ensuing level of water quality? 
4.  If each farm were to adopt targeted BMPs what would be the level of pollution abatement 
and overall impact on water quality in the regional watershed. 
5.  Given a policy what would be the adoption rate of targeted BMPs among the relevant set 
of farms at the regional scale and if adopted, what would be the overall levels of pollution 
abatement and water quality improvement? 
6.  Given a level of costs associated with the policy inducing producers to adopt BMPs, what 
are the associated social and economic benefits of the overall abatement of pollution in 
the region?  
A multi-faceted research program was designed to address these questions. The overall 
framework for addressing these questions was proposed by Yang et al. (2007). The fundamental 
components of the program consist first of understanding field and farm level environmental 
benefits of adopting BMPs as well as farm level costs of BMP adoption. In two study sites, Bras 
d‟Henri in Quebec (BdH) and South Tobacco Creek in Manitoba (STC), the economic and 
hydrological components were integrated and aggregated to a sub-watershed scale. Policies to 
encourage adoption of BMPs could be tested and the overall policy costs and benefits of BMP 
adoption can be evaluated.  
The integrated project model is illustrated in Figure 1.  The adoption of BMPs is determined 
by the on-farm costs of BMP adoption, as well as the type of policy incentives provided. The 
ultimate policy cost of BMP adoption depends on private benefits of BMPs that accrue to 
producers as well as the way in which the incentive payment is implemented. For example, 
producers might receive fixed payments for BMPs based on previously determined cost sharing 
rules. Or conservation contracts might be established with producers based on specific auction 
bid selection rules (e.g. lowest bid, maximum environmental benefit, etc.). The willingness of 
producers to accept payments for BMPs will depend on the design of the auction and contract, 
which in turn affect the costs of policy implementation.  
The behavior of agricultural producers under different incentive schemes is of particular 
relevance to governments and other organizations who manage conservation programs. Many 
jurisdictions use auctions to encouraging BMPs. Theoretical and empirical evidence from   19 
conservation auctions show that the performance of auctions depends on several factors 
including the shape of individual and aggregate cost functions for BMPs, as well as the degree of 
heterogeneity between producers in terms of costs and environmental benefits. In order to 
understand the performance of conservation programs, it is necessary to understand the 
responsiveness of producers to various incentive schemes. While the focus of the STC WEBS 
study is on non-point source contributions of nutrient loadings from agriculture, the research on 
adoption behavior and the performance of incentive schemes will contribute to our understanding 
of how to design successful conservation programs that improve the environment in a cost 
effective way. 
The adoption response of producers to various incentives is identified in the Farm Behavior 
component of the integrated modeling project. Auctions and other mechanisms for establishing 
contracts vary in a number of important characteristics including perceived fairness, cost 
effectiveness, and environmental benefits. BMP adoption scenarios for alternative BMP 
programs provide the following data to the integrated model: 
  Farm participation rates in BMP programs 
  Adoption levels (acres under adoption) 
  Delivery costs of BMPs. 
Once the adoption rate under different incentives is established it is possible to evaluate the 
program costs and environmental benefits of various policy incentives for BMP adoption. 
Finally, non-market valuation of the benefits would facilitate a full cost-benefit analysis of BMP 
programs. However, non-market valuation is outside the scope of the current WEBS program. In 
sum, the results of the integration framework will hopefully suggest cost effective policy 
measures for governments to achieve watershed scale pollution abatement targets. 
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Figure 1.  An integrated economic hydrologic modeling framework from Yang et al (2007). 
 
This report summarizes some preliminary results of the Farm Behavior component of the 
integrated modeling project that was implemented in the South Tobacco Creek watershed in 
Manitoba. In order to develop the producer response functions it was necessary to develop field 
and farm-level costs of BMP adoption based on knowledge of producer activity levels. This is 
facilitated by the existence of an extensive dataset of production information for the producers in 
the watershed from 1991 to 2006 collected by the Deerwood Soil ad Water Conservation 
Association. The first part of this report develops the on-farm cost models that were used to 
parameterize the farm behavior model. The second part of this report develops the farm behavior 
model. Producer adoption responses were tested using policy experiments with student subjects 
and limited trials with producers.   21 
A Review of BMP Costs of Adoption for Some STC BMPs 
 
 
The BMPs currently under examination in the South Tobacco Creek watershed are 
summarized in Table 1 below. We examine the first four of these in this research project. 
 
Table 1. The beneficial management practices (BMPs) being evaluated in South Tobacco Creek, 
Manitoba in the Watershed Evaluation of Beneficial Management Practices Program. 
 
 BMPs  Definition 
Riparian area management 
 
Cattle are given limited access to riparian areas by fences to 
prevent grazing.   
Converting cropland to forage 
(Green Cover) 
 
The cropland under cultivation is converted to perennial 
forage production providing continuous vegetative cover. 
  
Reduced or zero tillage  
Reduced or zero tillage refers to practices that minimize soil 
disturbance and maintain crop residual cover by using 
alternative tillage equipment and applying herbicide for weed 
control. 
 
Runoff holding pond 
Holding pond is constructed to temporarily store runoff from a 
cattle containment area, especially from a winter feeding area. 
  
Small reservoir retention   Small reservoir is constructed to monitor inflow and outflow 
and to assess downstream nutrient loading.  
Crop rotation  
 
A rotation based on the oilseed-cereal-legume-cereal model 
will ensure a good mix of high and low crop residues and a 
better defense against weeds and diseases. In addition, legume 
crops can biologically fix nitrogen in the soil. 
 
Source: “Assessing the Water Quality Benefit of BMPs: At Watershed Scale across Canada”, AAFC. “Steppler 
WEBs Project: South Tobacco Creek”, AAFC. 
 
 
The net costs of adopting BMPs consist of both direct costs due to changes in required 
management applications (e.g. purchase of new equipment for conservation till; changes in 
fertilizer applications), as well as indirect or opportunity costs related to foregone yields and net 
revenues from business as usual practices. BMPs can provide other indirect benefits. Some 
BMPs improve soil condition resulting in future yield improvements for example; BMPs may   22 
also reduce risk. In this section we review the existing literature on BMP costs and benefits to 
highlight potential cost drivers in STC.  
 
Beneficial Crop Rotations 
   A number of on-farm private benefits of beneficial crop rotations have been identified 
(Wicks and Howitt, 2005; Yiridoe and Weersink, 1998; Gebramedhim and Schwab, 1998): 
  Legumes fix nitrogen and reduce inorganic fertilizer needs;  
  The alternation between cereal and non-cereal crops breaks pest and disease cycles and 
reduces herbicide and chemical use;  
  Residues from legumes that contain N may also be utilized by the subsequent crop; 
  Including winter cover crops in the rotation may increase soil quality by building up soil 
organic matter and increasing subsequent yields. 
 
A number of studies find that production costs increase for beneficial crop rotations. For 
example, crops such as canola that are planted alternately with cereals have been shown to 
require more N fertilizer and more herbicide than cereal crops (Lafond et. al., 1993, Zentner et. 
al., 1999, Sonntag et. al., 1997; Hope et al., 2002). Lafond et al. (1993), and Zentner et al. (1999) 
find that input costs were greater for a beneficial crop rotation (such as cereal-oilseed-cereal-
legume) compared with a conventional crop rotation (cereal-cereal-cereal-fallow). Nonetheless, 
the improvements in crop yields and gross revenues from beneficial crop rotations outweigh 
these costs on average for the Black soil zone of the prairies. Zentner et al. (1999) find net 
benefits in the range of $23/ac to $27/ac.  Net returns were highest for cereal-oilseed-pulse 
rotations followed by cereal-oilseed rotations. Both of these rotations provide higher benefits 
than monoculture cereal cropping systems that include fallow every four years (Lafond et. al., 
1993). 
 
Beneficial crop rotations do not seem to have a significant effect on business risk. Reducing 
business risk requires a crop combination to have negative price and yield co-variances among 
the crops in the rotation. This would ensure that if the yield (or price) of one crop were to 
decline, the yields (or price) of another crop would offset the loss. Evidence suggests that there is 
little price covariance among spring wheat, barley, canola and field peas and hence beneficial   23 
crop rotations have little effect on reducing price risk (Bradshaw et al., 2004). Furthermore yield 
covariance is also small for some of the crop combinations (Bradshaw et al., 2004). 
 
BMPs can result in unintended environmental consequences which should be considered 
prior to implementing a BMP program. For example, beneficial crop rotations that include 
canola could require more inorganic N fertilizer use and herbicide use than cereals or other 
oilseeds. Further, because the stubble left over from harvesting canola is shorter than that from 
cereals, it does not provide as much a cover against erosion (Hope et al, 2002). 
 
Conservation Tillage 
With the exception of Ontario, where 31% of seeded land uses zero tillage, zero tillage is 
predominantly a prairie practice (Fig. 2).  Among the prairies, Saskatchewan has about 60% of 
its seeded area in zero tillage, followed by Alberta at 48%, and Manitoba at 21%. The seeded 
acreage in Manitoba is lower than the National average at 34%. 
 
A number of studies have examined the on-farm benefits and costs of conservation tillage 
across Canada. Table 2 shows changes in the costs of inputs for zero tillage for wheat and canola 
crops for farms of similar size and for agro-ecological zones similar to STC (Nagy, 2001; SAF 
2001). Both studies show an increased expenditure on herbicides, but savings in other inputs 
resulting in net savings. Neither of these two studies considers changes in fertilizer costs. While 
zero tillage is widely adopted in Canada, the benefits depend on several factors including soil 
zone, age of existing capital equipment, and type of crop rotation.  
 
Major factors influencing the economic viability of conservation tillage appear to be 
weather, types of equipment employed, and the amounts and price of other inputs including 
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Table 2.  Some financial impacts of adopting zero tillage on input costs (2001 $/acre). 
Cost component 












Herbicides  6.54  3.5  2.7  6.81 
Fuel and oil  -6.49  -2.7  -5.58  -2.7 
Machinery repair  -3.4  -1.15  -3.09  -1.15 
Operating interest  0  -0.1  -0.19  +0.8 
Hired Labour  -1.72  0  -1.54  0 
Machinery Depreciation 
and Interest 
-5.45  -3.52  -0.07  -3.52 
Unpaid Labour   -2.93  0  -2.93  0 
Inorganic fertilizer  0  0  0  0 
Total difference  -13.45  -3.87  -10.7  -0.56 
(Sources: Nagy, 2001; SAF, 2004) 
 
Impacts of zero tillage on yields and net farm income from a number of studies are 
summarized in Table 2. The first three studies summarize results from multi-decade crop trials 
conducted at the AAFC research station in Melfort, Saskatchewan which is in the same soil-
climatic zone as STC (Zentner et al. 2002; Zentner et al. 1999; and Agriculture and Agri-Food 
Canada, 2003). Zentner (1999) found that zero tillage had greater net returns than conventional 
tillage when combined with a beneficial crop rotation (cereal-oilseed-cereal-legume). However, 
net returns decreased with a cereal-cereal-cereal-fallow rotation. A comparison of crop yields by 
AAFC (2003) shows that zero tillage performed better than conventional tillage under both a 
cereal-oilseed rotation, and a cereal-legume rotation.   
Zero tillage appears to have negative impacts on farm income in moist conditions. For 
example, Zentner et al. 2002 find that producers in moist environments or those in dry climates 
during wet weather cycles get higher yields from conventional tillage than from conservation 
tillage. Gray et al. (1996) find that zero till does not generate much of a yield advantage over 
conventional till in the (relatively drier) Dark Brown soil zone, as it does on the Black soil zone. 
Gray et al. (1996) also note that the investment in zero tillage related machinery (particularly 
expensive seeding equipment) is more cost-effective if done at the end of the life cycle of the 
older machinery.  
Sparling and Brethour (2007) use data from a Canada wide survey, to calibrate a farm 
BMP simulation model to test the profitability of a suite of BMPs across Canada. They find that   26 
zero tillage improves yields for about half of the producers, and reduces costs among the 
majority. On average zero tillage increased farm net income in Manitoba by 12%. On the other 
hand, Samarawickrema and Belcher (2005) calibrated a farm model in Saskatchewan based on 
survey responses of producers who had adopted zero tillage. In their study, increases in input 
costs were greater than gains in revenue due to yield increases and net farm income was reduced 
by 8% after adoption of zero tillage.  
 
Table 3.  Some impacts of adopting zero tillage on farm revenues and income. 
Study  Location  Costs and benefits of adopting zero tillage 
(Zentner et al., 
2002) 
 
Melfort, SK  Conservation tillage practices reduce input costs between $3 
to $6 per acre for most crops, except Canola 
Zentner et al., 
(1999) 
Melfort, SK  Zero tillage with beneficial crop rotation increases income 
by $3 per acre; with continuous cereal rotation reduces 
income by $1 per acre. 
Agriculture and 
Agri-Food 
Canada  (2003) 
Melfort, SK 
(1986-9) 
Zero tillage provided a yield advantage between 5% and 
26%, for a cereal-pulse rotation. For a cereal-oilseed 
rotation, the yield advantage was between 7% and 13%  




Zero tillage provided the following yield advantages and 
disadvantages compared with conventional tillage: 
Black soil zone: yields increased, 0% to 18% 
Dark Brown soil zone: yields increased 6% for wheat, but 





Half the producers practicing zero till perceived yield 
increases, in cereals and canola. A majority perceived a 
decrease in costs. Model results showed increases in 






Net farm income for zero tillage declined by $8/ac, but 
yields for zero tillage were higher by 6% to 20%  
 
   27 
Some studies have examined the impact that zero tillage has on farm business risk. 
Zentner et. al., (1999) indicated that producers at Indian Head, Saskatchewan with low risk 
aversion would choose the most diversified crop rotation with minimum tillage or zero tillage. 
Producers with medium or high risk aversion would also chose a diversified rotation (depending 
on grain prices), but only with zero till. 
 
Non agro-environmental factors that influence the likelihood of adopting zero tillage in 
Canada include (Sparling and Brethour, 2007; Boame, 2005) are:  
  Producer Age - likelihood of adopting zero tillage peaks between ages 36 and 55, and 
then declines.  This is likely because this group of farmers is the most likely to benefit 
from long term yield benefits.  
  Size of  Farm - operators of large farms are more likely to adopt, possibly due to 
economies of scale required to make large machinery cost outlays cost effective.  
  Custom Harvesting - farm operations that have customized harvester operations are more 
likely to see zero tillage adoption, possibly to reduce labour costs.  
  Off-Farm Income - Producers with off-farm income were more likely to adopt zero 
tillage because they had higher opportunity costs of labour.  
  Producers who have poultry and cattle are less likely to adopt, while those having „other 
livestock‟ such as elk, goat, bison and llamas, are more likely to adopt. Although the 
reasons for this pattern are not clear, it is speculated that they may be related to attitudinal 
factors that are correlated with size of farm, and preferences for adopting experimental 
practices. 
A number of studies report unintended consequences as a result of adopting tillage.  Zero 
tillage increases stubble and level of organic matter on the soil surface which reduces the speed 
of water run-off and increases water infiltration. Zero tillage also slows the process of 
nitrification of inorganic N fertilizer. These two effects may lead to an increase of inorganic N in 
the leachate to ground water (Weersink, 2001). Zero tillage also was found to increase the use of 
fertilizer (Samarawickrema, 2005); changes in N fertilizer use after adoption ranged between 
minus 20 to plus 80% and changes in inorganic P fertilizer were between 0 and 50%. Adoption 
of zero tillage may also negatively impact waterfowl because the multiple passes of machinery   28 
under conventional tillage created an impermeable layer in the sub-soil which helped maintain 
sloughs and pot-holes in the fields (Samarawickrema, 2005). 
 
 
Converting Cropland to Forage 
There are relatively few studies discussing the farm economic benefits of converting 
cropland to forage. Forage and pasture are encouraged in non-arable marginal lands. However, 
when forage (particularly forage legumes) are cultivated in arable lands as part of a rotation they 
help enhance subsequent crop production yields due to improvements in soil quality, particularly 
through improvements in soil structure and texture which improve water holding capacity, 
aeration, and organic matter (Cambell et al., 1990; Entz, 2006). Improvements to soil quality 
have improved grain yields between 9% and 82% compared with continuously seeding grain in 
Iowa and Minnesota (Scheaffer et al., 2001). The largest increases took place in loamy sand 
while the smaller increases took place in silt loam soils. However, in some soil conditions 
additional N fertilizer had to be applied in order for the subsequent yield improvements to be 
realized (Scheaffer, 2001). If pasture is grazed by livestock, there are added advantages to soil 
quality as grazing cattle are able to return N to the soil in form of their excreta (Barclay, 2006). 
This benefit is lost when forage is mechanically harvested and fed to cattle off-site.  
  
A host of private benefits of converting cropland to perennial grass in western Canada 
could be discussed in relation to the Permanent Cover Program (PCP) (I and II). A joint federal-
provincial program was created between years 1989-1992 to address the problem of increasing 
soil quality degradation from unsustainable cropping practices on marginal lands. This program 
encouraged the conversion of marginal lands (classes 4, 5, and 6) from crops to permanent grass 
cover. Eligible participants were provided a seeding payment of $50/ha and a subsequent one-
time payment between $20/ac and $65/ac, depending on the length of the contract and province. 
A total of 522,000 ha of marginal lands were signed up for a total cost of $74 million in 
payments. A sample of 500 producers was interviewed in 1994 regarding their perceptions of the 
program (Vaisey, Weins and Wetlaufer, 1996). Among those who participated in the survey, 70 
% perceived decreased operating costs. There were fewer costs on annual cropland resulting 
from reduced need for gully repair and rock picking, and reduced fertilizer costs. About 60%   29 
said it decreased the need to purchase livestock feed. On the other hand, there were extra costs 
related to fencing, moving livestock or forage, water supply development, labour, wildlife 
damage, and travel time. Fifty-six percent perceived an increase in net farm income
3. The 
participants indicated that they were using their PCP lands for the following purposes. A large 
proportion (79%) indicated that they used their PCP lands for haying. Of these, 85% fed their 
hay to their own herd, while 12% sold it to a neighbor. Approximately 65% percent also used the 
lands to graze their own cattle (Vaisey et al., 1996).  
 
The PCP program resulted in a wide variety of public benefits including reduced federal 
government payments under former acreage based programs targeted at annual crop production 
(1993 payments were estimated at $11 million). The estimated benefit of reduced wind erosion 
on crop productivity was $2 - $5 million. The program reduced sedimentation and chemical 
residues as well as government expenditures from removing wind and water borne sediments 
from ditches (Vaisey et al., 1996). 
 
Tables 4 and 5 below examine some influences of forage production on crops and soils as 
well as producer factors affecting forage adoption. 
 
Table 4.  The influence of growing alfalfa on some agronomic and environmental parameters. 
 
Parameter  Nature of Alfalfa Influence  References 
Soil N  Five year alfalfa stand provides significant N for two 
following crops. N benefit can last up to 7 years Release of N 
from legume residue slower when legume stand terminated 
using no-till.  
 
Annual alfalfa crops can contribute an average 50 kg ha
-1 N to 
the soil. As high as 120 kg ha
-1.  
Ferguson and Gorby (1971), 
Bowren and Cooke (1975), 
Bailey (1987). Hoyt and Leitch 
(1983), Mohr, Entz and Janzen 
(unpublished data) 
 
Bruuslema and Christie (1987), 
Kelner (1994).  
                                                 
3 It should be emphasized that the net farm income increase was perceived and not actual. As well, the sample of 
PCP participants cannot be generalized to the farm population because they were farmers who are likely to have a 
greater percentage of marginal land.   30 
Soil structure  Alfalfa roots perform " biological tillage", thereby improving 
soil environment for root growth of subsequent crops.  
On heavy clay soils, inclusion of alfalfa in rotation increases 
soil water infiltration. No-till alfalfa removal keeps pores 
intact.  
Blackwell et al. (1990), Entz 
(1994) 
Meek et al. (1990), Cavers and 
Eilers, Dept. of Soil Sci, U of 
MB (1994)  
Subsoil N   A four year alfalfa stand effectively extracted N to a depth of 
260 cm on an Osbourne clay soil in Manitoba.  
Fallowing the year after forage breaking increases subsoil N, 
thereby increasing the risk of groundwater contamination.  
Entz and Vessey (unpublished)  
 
Campbell et al. (1994)  
Weeds  Two or three years of forage in a six year rotation virtually 
eliminated wild oat in cereal crops.  
A survey of commercial fields in Manitoba indicated 
significantly fewer wild oat, green foxtail and Canada thistle 
plants in wheat following forage crops vs. wheat following 
annual crops.  
 
Eighty percent of producers in a MB/SK survey indicated 
fewer weeds in annual crops after forage-breaking compared 
with annual crops in an annual crop rotation. Good control of 
wild oat, green foxtail and Canada thistle was observed for a 
period of one (11% of respondents), two (50% of 
respondents), or more (33% of respondents) years.  
Siemens (1963)  
 









Black and Gray soil zones: Soil water in 0 to 60 cm usually 
recharged in alfalfa rotation, but subsoil drier. Fallow not 
required for water recharge after forage-breaking. Removing 
alfalfa stands using no-till increases soil water recharge by up 
to 3 cm.  
Dark Brown soil zone: Including alfalfa in rotation results in 
moisture shortages in following year. Fallow required for 
water recharge after forage-breaking.  
Hoyt and Leitch (1983), Entz 
(1994), Bullied and Entz 
(unpublished data)  
 
 
Brandt and Keys (1982)  
Grain yield of 
following 
crops 
Recent survey indicated that 71% of producers in MB and SK 
observe a yield benefit from including forages in their crop 
rotations. Yield benefit greatest in wetter areas and lowest in 
Brown soil zone. Yield benefits decrease sharply as alfalfa 
stand length increases beyond four years.  
Cumulative yield benefit occurs when legumes repeatedly 
included in cereal-based crop rotation.  
 
In dry years, grain yields greater when alfalfa removed using 
no-till vs. tilled system.  






Poyser et al. (1957).  
 
 
Entz and Gulden (unpublished 
data)  
(Source: Entz et al., 2008)   31 
 
Table 5.  Some factors influencing adoption of forage by prairie producers. 
 
Questions on forage 
crop management  
Percent response by producers  Comments 
Main farm enterprise  Mixed (grain and livestock) - 
62.8%; Dairy, Livestock only, Grain 
and forage seed - (10% each). 
Mixed farms evenly distributed across survey area; 
forage seed concentrated in eastern MB and 
northeastern SK. Percent of tillable acres on survey 
farms dedicated to forages - 30%. 
 
Rotational benefits: 
Grain yield following 
forages. 
Higher yield after forages - 67.4%; 
Lower yields after forages - 9.3%; 
No change - 23.3% 
Yield benefits of forages greatest in wetter areas 
and lowest in southern SK. In dry areas, as 
frequency of summerfallow after forage breaking 
increased, rotational yield benefits increased. Yield 




Weed suppression by 
forages. 
Fewer weeds after forage-breaking - 
83.3%  
More weeds after forage-breaking - 
7.9%  
No difference in weed populations - 
8.8%  
Producers noted weed suppression for one (11% of 
respondents), 2 (50% of respondents), or more 
(33% respondents) years after forage-breaking. 
Suppression noted for annual grasses, annual 
broadleaf weeds and Canada thistle. 
Forage stand length  Average forage stand length 6.5 
years. Forage stands longest in 
southern SK (>8 years), and shortest 
in south-central MB (4 to 5 years). 
Current forage stand length much longer than 
required for rotational yield and weed control 
benefits, and slightly longer than economic 
optimum (which is 4 or 5 years, Jeffrey et al. 
1993).  
 
Why do farmers 
terminate forage 
stands? 
Reduced yields - 58.1%; gophers - 
18.7%; rotational considerations - 
11.6%. 
The strategy of most producers is to maximize 
forage stand life, and rotate forages only when 
necessary due to declining productivity.  
 
How do producers 
terminate forage 
stands? 
Tillage alone - 76.6%; tillage and 
herbicides - 22.1%; herbicides alone 
- 1.3%. 
Over 20% of producers indicated fallowing land for 
one full year after forage stand termination. 
Producers who used both tillage and herbicides 
relied less heavily on fallow the year after forage 
stand termination (19 vs. 27% for those who used 
tillage alone).  
(Source: Entz et al., 2008) 
 
A Swedish study examining factors influencing willingness to convert land to forage 
during the Swedish Agricultural Reform of 1990 found likely adopters included farmers in the 
middle of their farming career, and producers with larger farms (Anderson, 2005). When crop 
production is no longer required to receive payments, farmers in the middle of their farming 
career are more likely to reconsider their choice of the vocation and opt for an alternative 
occupation than farmers in the beginning or end of their career. Larger farms were more likely to   32 
convert their land. They could afford to reduce their part of their operations compared to smaller 
farms. Higher economic potential in the region reduced the likelihood of conversion. This could 
indicate that farmers in more prosperous regions had off-farm employment already. This fact 
could imply that the production would remain in areas with a high economic potential, where the 
farmer is less dependant on off-farm income. Adoption was more likely in less fertile land, as 
would be expected, because the opportunity cost is lower. Highly specialized (value added) 
farms and those involved in labour intensive livestock operations reduced the chances of 
adopting, possibly because of greater opportunity cost of converting (Anderson, 2005). 
 
Riparian Area Management   
Riparian restoration provides a large number of public benefits including reduced off-site 
sediment and nutrient loadings, and increased waterfowl and native fish populations. Other off-
site benefits include reductions in bacteria and pathogens from livestock farm runoff and cattle 
drinking water from creeks, improved recreation, ease of navigation, flood control and reduced 
water treatment costs (see Lynch and Tjaden, 2000;Yang et al., 2004; Watson et al., 2006). 
Lynch and Tjaden (2000) estimate that establishing buffers in Maryland to remove 40% of 
nutrients could cost about $617,000 annually. A comparable structural engineering approach 
involving major design and installation of storm water retention ponds would cost $3.7 billion 
annually.  
 
Several studies have discussed the factors influencing the private costs of implementing a 
buffer strip for riparian area protection on a farm (Sohngen et al., 1999; Watson et al., 2006; 
Rein, 1999). The initial capital outlay includes fencing costs, off-site watering troughs for the 
cattle, and costs of seeding perennial grass or planting shrubs or trees as buffers. There are also 
annual maintenance costs for repairing fences, maintaining water troughs, and trimming the 
hedges or pruning the trees, if applicable. Finally, there are opportunity costs from not 
undertaking crop production on the site, as well as extra nuisance costs from maneuvering farm 
equipment around the buffer. There could also be opportunity costs to cattle grazers or ranchers 
from controlled grazing (Watson et al., 2006).  The private benefits of riparian area management 
include top soil retention which improves crop production, benefits in scenic appearance to the   33 
farm, as well as benefits from increased sales of fishing and hunting rights.
4 The landowner 
could also benefit from the aesthetic appearance and harvest of trees, grass or orchard crops (e.g. 
Lynch and Tjaden, 2000).  
  
Sparling and Brethour (2007) found that across all provinces installing buffer strips 
resulted in a negative private net benefit because of the lost productivity of land and initial 
capital outlay. The net loss after installing a buffer strip on an average Manitoba farm was 1% t 
(Sparling and Brethour 2007). Sohngen et al (1999) suggest that buffer strips may be more cost 
effective on larger fields as the cost of riparian area protection could decrease if producers 
manage and harvest timber or other marketable products from the buffer strip.  
 
A number of studies evaluated factors that affect the water quality impacts of buffer 
strips. Buffer size was identified as an important factor by Uusi-Kampa et al. (2003). Buffer strip 
effectiveness can also be increased by enrolling land parcels that are located closer to the source 
of the pollutants (Uusi-Kampa et al. 2003).  This suggests that on a watershed scale buffer zones 
need to be spatially targeted and that adjacency to other buffer strips will increase the 
productivity of the buffer. With use of integrated hydrologic-GIS and economic models, it was 
found that the benefits of reduced sediment erosion can be increased by enrolling land parcels 
that are closer to water bodies, and have higher erodible soils and slopes (Yang et al., 2003; 
Yang and Weersink, 2005). Furthermore, cost-effectiveness could be further increased if the 
buffer width is allowed to vary by location, rather than assuming a uniform width (giving 
preference to slope, soil erodibility and proximity to water bodies).  
 
Summary 
This literature review suggests that there are private benefits for some of the BMPs 
examined in STC. In some cases the benefits from beneficial crop rotations, conservation tillage 
and perennial cover exceed the private costs of implementation for some producers. However, 
heterogeneity in soils, climate, and producer characteristics are all shown to have an impact on 
BMP costs and benefits. Thus, adoption of these practices would likely not be advantageous 
                                                 
4 In the US, on certain preserved lands, landowners are allowed to sell fishing licenses and hunting leases (which, 
for the latter have been between $5 and $20 per acre).   34 
across all farms in most watersheds. Some BMPs, like riparian area management, generally have 
greater public benefits than private benefits, and may require incentives for adoption. The review 
confirms that programs that encourage adoption of BMPs should consider variation in producer 
characteristics that influence costs and benefits of BMPs.   35 
  
Estimating On-Farm Costs of Adoption of BMPs in South Tobacco Creek 
 
South Tobacco Creek (STC) is a sub-watershed of the Red River in the rural municipality 
(RM) of Thompson (058) in Southern Manitoba. The STC watershed drains 7,638 ha of which 
71% (5,409 ha) is under cultivation in a total of 333 individual fields owned by 42 farm owners 
and a Hutterite Colony.  In the most recent census (2001), RM Thompson is comprised of 144 
farms on 109,646 acres (44,372 ha). Average farm size in Thompson is 308.13 ha which is equal 
to 4.76 quarter sections. The farm size in STC averages about 125.79 ha (approximately 2 
quarter sections), which is much lower than the average for the RM of Thompson. However, this 
is an under-estimate because portions of some farms in the Deerwood Soil and Water 
Management Association not included because they fall outside the watershed boundaries.  
 
Historical land use data on crops, yields, and management inputs such as fertilizer, 
herbicide use, and type of tillage practice, was provided by the Deerwood Soil and Water 
Management Association for 353 fields from 1991 – 2006 in the watershed. This data was edited 
and supplemented with other information by Dr. Mohammad Khakzaban and staff from AAFC. 
This land use data was combined with soils data from the „Manitoba Soil Database‟ (AAFC, 
2002) including soil class, soil texture, and slope, and climate data including temperature and 
precipitation obtained from, Environment Canada (2005 and 2007), for the meteorological 
station at Miami Thiesen, Manitoba.. Information on crop prices for crops and forage were 
obtained as a 10 –year average from 1994-2003, to reduce the effect of year-to-year price 
variation. Prices for crops were obtained from SAF (2003) and for forage from personal 
communication with Sumach (2007). BMP management costs were obtained from MAFRI farm 
budgets models (MAFRI 2004a; 2004b) and validated by the literature where possible from SAF 
(2004). 
 
The Deerwood data set provides the history of crop type, yield, field size, various field 
practices including spring and fall tillage, seeding and harvesting, straw management, fertilizer, 
manure and pesticide applications by field and by farm. Detailed information for the Steppler   36 
farm was obtained through a site tour on June 7
th, 2006 and is can be found in Deng (2006). The 
historical data suggest the following land use trends in the watershed. First, spring wheat is the 
dominant crop in STC. When alternated with an oilseed, canola is the dominant oilseed in the 
rotation, as indicated by the inverse relationship between acres of spring wheat and canola in a 
given year. Furthermore, while spring wheat acres seem to rise and fall with price, canola 
acreage relationship to price is not as strong. Generally producers in the basin seem to follow a 
cereal-oilseed rotation, but if prices are favorable they follow cereals with cereals and oilseeds 
with oilseeds. This indicates that producers actively make tradeoffs between future productivity 
and current revenues, even if they are relatively small. While in the early period of data 
collection continuous cropping of wheat was observed on several fields, towards the latter 
periods of the study, farms seemed to increasingly adopt a cereal-oilseed rotation.  
  
The major crops grown in Thompson are spring wheat (32,014 acres), canola (13,020 
acres), barley (7,492 acres), alfalfa (5,282 acres) and oats (5,247 acres).
5 Only a very small 
portion of the land in RM Thompson is in summerfallow (3,222 acres), representing 3% of total 
area of farms (AAFC, 2004). Forage and pasture production have been on the rise in recent years 
(Turner, personal communication). The crops grown in STC in between 1991-2006 are 
summarized in Figure 3 and are similar to the agronomic patterns found in the RM Thompson 
overall.  
 
As of 2006, 12 producers had cattle (29% of total farms), and approximately 20% of the 
area was in alfalfa, oats, forage, or pasture. The total amount of forage has been increasing 
steadily, from less than 5% in the early 90s, to over 10% of area since 2001. Forage provides 
benefits both for grazing cattle, as well as for improving soil quality. The number of cattle and 
the number of producers with cattle has increased steadily since 1990. Accordingly, forage fields 
have doubled from 1990 – 2000 or from 490 ha to 890 ha. The location of new forage fields 
seems to be determined by their proximity to other forage fields, rather than on sandier soils or 
places needing erosion control. This suggests that ownership of cattle seem to strongly influence 
                                                 
5 We note that the scientific standard is to report metric units. However, since our research is on farm behaviour we 
chose to use acres instead of hectares because acres are better understood by most Canadian producers.   37 
location of forage and also a tradeoff between erosion control and nutrient management if forage 
fields are used for grazing (Hope et al., 2002). Finally, there was no increased adoption of zero 
tillage by producers in the watershed over the time frame of the sample – with less than 15% of 
wheat and canola not tilled over the time period. This is less than the average rate of adoption in 
the prairies and signals the presence of potential barriers to adopting the zero till BMP that could 




Figure 3. The distribution of crop acreage in South Tobacco Creek during 1991-2006. 
 
Several BMPs are being tested experimentally on the Steppler farm. Within the STC 
watershed, the Steppler farm
6 is located near the town of Miami, approximately 150 km 
southwest of Winnipeg. The Steppler farm is a mixed farm with grain-production and beef cow 
operation, which is the dominant farm type in the watershed. The runoff from the Steppler farm 
                                                 
6 Farm id 49 in the data set, on fields  154-157, 171-174, 178-194, 212-217, 305,306, 312, 328, 334, 353, 355, 361, 
and 364. 
 










28%  38 
drains through South Tobacco Creek, and flows into the Red River and finally into Lake 
Winnipeg which has water quality problems, particularly related to phosphorous loads. Steppler 
farm was selected as a representative farm for the STC watershed (Deng, 2006). The size of the 
Steppler farm is 210 ha, with primarily soils of clay-loam. Annual cropping and cattle production 
are the main activities on the farm. Wheat, barley, canola, flax and alfalfa are the major crops in 
the rotation. Wheat, flax and canola are marketed as cash crops whereas barley and hay are only 
produced to feed cow-calves and self finish feeder cattle. Greenfeed oats are often seeded as 
cover crops in spring and harvested in fall after the hay cuts. Usually for the first cut hay, 4-5 
round bails (around 1200 lbs. per round) are produced per acre. Alfalfa fields are returned to crop 
production after a 4-year rotation. As for the cattle operation, the current herd size is about 100 
cows. Calves are weaned in November at a weight of 600 lbs. and wintered on the farm. Silage 
(greenfeed oats and hay) is fed to cattle starting from the beginning of January.   
Methods 
 
The farm behavior research requires the distribution of BMP costs across producers in the 
watershed. This requires the development of field and farm specific cost functions associated 
with BMP adoption. The net cost of adopting BMPs for producers includes both direct and 
indirect costs of adoption. In some cases, BMPs lead to an increase in productivity or a yield 
boost which counts as an additional private benefit of adoption.  Direct costs include additional 
management and operating costs, and amortized capital costs where new investment in 
equipment is required. Indirect costs include the opportunity cost of not following the baseline 
(conventional) cropping pattern. Opportunity costs are the net benefits associated with 
conventional cropping systems with no BMPs applied. 
 
In the analysis we assume that production functions for crops and livestock are separable. 
Although livestock may provide nutrient inputs and crops provide feed for livestock, we assume 
that there are no joint production benefits and that the cost of feed is exactly equal to the 
opportunity cost of not selling feed on to the market. Producers would benefit from nutrient 
application from manure however we were unable to capture this input in the existing data as 
there is no time series information on livestock numbers in the watershed. However, the value of 
manure inputs can be captured by the price of substitute chemical inputs. Finally, the presence of   39 
livestock might alter the type of farm and rotation patterns. This effect is partially accounted for 
in the forage crop model which is treated separately from grain and oilseed crops. The general 
methodology for estimating BMP costs is given in Figure 4 below. 
 
 




Estimate and/or Calculate Producer 
Input and/or Construction Costs for 
BMPs 
Step 5 
Project Costs for Each BMP by Farm 
and/or Field for 2006-2018 
Step 4 
Project Yields and Revenues for Each 
BMP by Farm and Field for 2006-2018  
Step 6 
Calculate BMP Costs by Field and Farm (Net 
Farm Income with BMPs – Baseline Net Farm 
Income) 
Step 2 
Estimate Yield and Revenue Functions 
for BMPs  
Step 1 
Estimate Baseline Farm Income Based on 
Opportunity Cost Model   40 
The Opportunity Cost Model 
 
The estimation of opportunity costs forms the basis of all of the BMP cost projections 
used in the cost estimates developed in this study. The approach used in developing the 




Figure 5. A diagram showing the opportunity cost model. 
 
Rules for Assigning Future Crop Rotations 
 
In order to project the opportunity cost of lost production, it is necessary to determine the 
baseline crop production pattern, in this case the projected crop rotation on each field. This step 





STC Historic Land Use Data 1990-2005 
Estimation of Yield 
Functions 
Project   yield functions 
for each field for each 
crop type 
Project  future crop rotation 
over the implementation 
period 2006-20018) 
Baseline Revenues by field 
Based on soil and management 
characteristics 
Develop Rules for Future 
Crop  Rotation   41 
calculate any changes in revenue during that year. Based on the historic data we identified four 
types of crop rotations which were used to classify each field. The crop rotation types and rules 
to classify each field by type used for the projection model are: 
1.  cereal oilseed mix (beneficial crop rotation) – field had approximately 1/3 of time or five 
or more years in oilseeds historically (out of 16);  
2.  forage – field had seven or more years of forages out of 16 (with 6.6  years the average 
length of a complete forage cycle based on historical data in the watershed);  
3.  Pasture - fields reported with pasture were assumed to remain as pasture 
4.  Continuous cereal – all other crop rotations. 
 
Assigning Crops to Rotations 
  Rules were also developed to assign specific crops to rotations for twelve years (2007-
2018) based on the distribution of crop types given in Table 6. These rotations were:  
 
  Beneficial Crop Rotation: For  fields defined as having „beneficial crop rotation‟ 
practices (i.e. 1 above),  the crops were constructed to ensure that there are two 
consecutive years of cereals and one year of oilseeds (e.g., cereal – cereal – oilseeds or 
cereal – oilseeds- cereal,  or oilseeds – cereal –cereal). For example if a field had cereals 
for years 2005 and 2006, an oilseed would be assigned in 2007, followed by two cereal 
crops. 
  Forage Rotation: For fields assigned with a forage rotation, each farm is assumed to be in 
forage until it reaches the average length of forage time (seven years). Once forage is 
terminated it is replaced with a four year beneficial crop rotation until the next 7 year 
round of forage. For example, if a field was in forage from 2001-2006, it would be 
assigned a forage crop for 2007 and 2008, and then assigned a cereal, cereal, oilseed, 
cereal crop until 2012 when the forage cycle would resume. 
  Pasture: Any field identified as pasture is assumed to remain pasture permanently. 
  Continuous Cereal Rotation: For fields assumed to be in a continuous cereal rotation, 
crops were chosen so that there are four consecutive years of cereals followed by one 
year of oilseeds (e.g., cereal – cereal – cereal – cereal – oilseeds – cereal – cereal – cereal 
– cereal – oilseeds)    42 
Assigning Crop Types to Crop Categories 
 
Cereal crop categories were assigned the following crop types: wheat, barley and oats. 
Oilseed crop categories were assigned the crop types: flax and canola. In order to assign specific 
crops to each crop category we randomized the selection of cereals and oilseeds based on their 
relative distribution in the historical data set. The projections were constrained to approximately 
preserve both the ratio of the crop type relative to the number of observations, and the ratio of 
crop type relative to allocated land. This randomization process provided a relatively good 
approximation for both criteria for barley, oats and flax, but overestimated wheat and 
underestimated canola (Table 6).  
 




1991 – 2006 (16 years) 
Projected 
2007 – 2018 (12 years) 
Acres  No. of 
observations 
Acres  No. of 
observations 








































Total     159,990   3,516  139,897  3,259 
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Estimation of Crop Yield Functions with and without BMPs 
 
Crop yields with and without BMPs were estimated using the linear model shown in Equation 1 
using SAS version 9.1. Note also that functional forms for various input variables (e.g. N and P) 
were also examined
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   (1) 
where
8 Yi  = yield of crop i (bushels per acre),  1   = constant, GS/GDD = weather variable 
multiplied by a factor of 100, SCi= soil class dummy variables for Regosols and Brunisols 
respectively, N and P = nitrogen and phosphorous applications (kg/ha/year), Pest = pesticide 
application index, NoTill = 1 if zero till was employed and 0 otherwise, Continuous = 1 if crop 
type was the same in two consecutive years, Legume = 1 if legumes were planted the previous 
year, and Dj = dummy variables for each producer in the data.  
Regression equations were developed for the five most common crops - barley, oats, 
canola and flax (i.e., i = 1…5). Crop yields were measured in bushels per acre. Weather was 
represented by water ratio - built as a ratio of precipitation to growing degree days over 5 C.
9 
The soil variables refer to soil class, texture and slope (texture and slope were found to be 
insignificant) obtained from the National Soils Database. GS/GDD is the explanatory variable 
for weather where GS is gross precipitation and GDD is growing degree days.
10 The ratio 
                                                 
7 Note that in theory we expect the relationships between management inputs and yields to be non-linear (i.e. to 
experience diminishing returns). However significant non-linear models were ruled out using Box-Cox tests. The 
reason that many non-linear functional forms did not perform as well as more linear ones is that generally producers 
are not observed applying inputs above optimal levels. Therefore, we do not feel that significant diminishing returns 
from management would be observed in this producer data. 
8 Note that although this is a panel data set the subscript t has been eliminated from the equation for notational 
convenience. 
9 Water ratio was built using information on degree days over 5°C and precipitation from the Natural Resources 
Canada weather website for the meteorological station at Miami Thiesen, Manitoba. 
10 Following Cortus‟s study (2005), the precipitation was simply summed for the days within the growing season 
(May to September) to obtain growing season precipitation (GS). Daily growing degree days (GDD) were calculated 
according to the following equation: 
                   K MinTemp MaxTemp Max   2 / ) ( , 0    44 
between GS and GDD constitutes a proxy for “water use to water demand” ratio that determines 
the growing condition for crops (Cortus, 2005).  
Agricultural practices in the model included rates of N and P fertilizer application 
(kg/ha/year) as well as pesticide use and dummy variables for zero tillage.
 11 Beneficial crop 
rotation benefits were estimated using the following lag variables: the variable Continuous Crop 
is a dummy variable if the same type of crop is grown in two consecutive years and the Legume 
lag variable identifies whether legumes were grown in the previous year.
12 No-till is a discrete 
variable indicating yes if there were absolutely no tillage operations in the spring or fall (Lafond 
et al., 1993)
13. The role of individual producer management techniques and farm specific land 




Parameter estimates from OLS models of best fit for crop yield are shown in Table 7.  
Field and farm revenues were calculated by multiplying yields by ten-year average prices
15.  
 
Table 7.  Crop yield functions for five crops using the Deerwood Soil and Water Management 






Wheat  Canola  Barley  Flax  Oats 
Constant  6.605  50.119**  28.901**  9.061**  -46.538 
GS/GDD  3.870**  -0.002  1.436  1.526**  9.288** 
(GS/GDD)
2  -0.087**  -0.005  -0.031  -0.034**  -0.195** 
SC1 (Regosols)  3.331**  1.932        -18.566 
                                                                                                                                                             
where K was the threshold temperature; For this research, 5 C. is used. MaxTemp was the maximum daily 
temperature, and MinTemp was the minimum daily temperature. The daily GDD values were summed over the 
growing season to obtain growing degree days for the year. 
11 The pesticide index was obtained from Khakbazan (2007). Nutrient applications included chemical applications 
only, and do not account for extra manure spread from livestock operations. Given lack of time series data on 
livestock in the current data, regression coefficients may overestimate the marginal contributions of fertilizer. 
12 Legumes refer to faba beans, field peas and beans (white, navy). There were about 20 observations of legumes in 
the historic data. Because of their small representation in this historic data they are not used in future rotation 
projections for 2007-2018. 
13 In zero tillage the only disturbance on the soil occurs during seeding (Lafond et al., 1993). We did not test for the 
percentage of residue being greater than 30%. 
14 Producer dummy variables were constructed for each year rather than just the current year allowing us to capture 
the effects of management changes due to changes in ownership over time could be captured over time. 
15 Average prices were calculated for a period of greater than 10 years going back from year 2004, using SAF data.   45 
SC2 (Brunisols)        5.269**  0.682    
Total N     0.148**     0.053**  -0.021 
Sqrt total N  -0.203**  -1.859**  -0.192  -0.655**  1.114 
Total P        -0.582**       
Sqrt total P  0.235  0.312  3.880**  -0.023  1.103 
Pest index  0.029  0.758**  4.556**  -0.366  0.582 
No-till  4.762**  -5.506**  2.282  -2.553  -20.423** 
Continuous crop  -1.870**  2.693  -0.226  -3.165**  -10.809** 
Legume lag1  0.280  0.581  8.292       
Prod_1                
Prod_2  -12.094**  -11.596**  29.014**  0.767  26.392** 
Prod_4  -5.914     2.277     13.275 
Prod_5  -17.448**        -6.559    
Prod_8  -13.331**  -6.940     1.547    
Prod_9  6.497  -13.874**  23.246**       
Prod_10  -8.099**     4.469       
Prod_11  -9.720**  -14.821**          
Prod_12  -7.918**  -15.260**     -1.896    
Prod_13  -12.652**  -20.501**          
Prod_14  -11.230**  -20.340**     -3.684**  9.819 
Prod_15  -11.380**  -23.127**     -2.759    
Prod_16  0.108  -10.008**  9.854  -3.266  27.626** 
Prod_17  -10.815**     6.778  -1.813  29.225** 
Prod_18  7.332**  -8.988**  -12.861**       
Prod_21  2.712  -15.905**        -45.247** 
Prod_22  -13.789*           27.483 
Prod_24  -5.199**  -13.783**  -13.615  4.015**  3.265 
Prod_25  -11.511**  -17.420**  21.852**  -13.294**    
Prod_26  -10.382**     12.872**     23.849** 
Prod_27  -11.710**  -16.902**  -13.611**       
Prod_28  -1.419  -12.254**     -1.670  25.487 
Prod_29  -1.903  -20.638**  1.144       
Prod_31  -10.558**  -19.917**  -5.227  -3.766    
Prod_32  -1.963  -7.636**  19.168**  3.296**  0.171 
Prod_33  0.400  -7.675**  23.952**  1.128  3.470 
Prod_34  -7.672**  -14.321**  6.214  0.918  7.286 
Prod_35  -2.957  -9.466**  13.143**  4.380**  25.315 
Prod_36  -0.462  -9.386**     1.515  45.569** 
Prod_37  -14.187**  -25.874**     2.066    
Prod_38  -5.029  -28.643**     1.895    
Prod_39  -5.169**  -14.331**  27.926**  -0.210  8.835 
Prod_40  -7.707**  -16.300**  1.784  0.871  13.182 
Prod_41  -4.798*  -19.943**  6.456  3.053**  10.730 
Prod_42  -9.724**  -14.046**  -17.840**  -4.149**  1.498 
Prod_43  -8.118  -1.937        21.868**   46 
Prod_44  -1.882  -19.654**  12.939**  18.334**    
Prod_45  10.027**  -4.472  20.347**       
Prod_46  -23.431**             
Prod_47  -7.547**  -16.306**  11.881**  0.892  23.004** 
Prod_48  -20.387**  -14.630**          
Prod_49  -8.779**  -17.021**  3.265  -0.920  4.590 
Prod_50  -4.315  -10.471**  8.500  6.301**  8.615 
Prod_51  0.387  -4.168  11.524     21.139** 
Prod_52  -8.403**  -9.384**  18.191**  -0.999  14.778 
Prod_53  -11.379**  -15.513**     0.632  25.874** 
Prod_54  -1.959  -19.633**        26.141** 
Prod_55  -7.699           19.422 
Prod_56  -14.448**           -14.746 
Prod_57  21.480**  2.488  34.466**       
Prod_58              16.173 
Prod_59     -18.987**  12.410  -5.355    
Prod_60  -13.407**  -21.788**     -4.524**    
Prod_61  -13.149**     -7.547  -7.187**    
Prod_62  -6.969**  -12.815**          
R
2  0.347  0.330  0.409  0.323  0.319 
Number of obs.  1,513  874  404  413  286 
** signifies P<0.10 
 
Discussion of Crop Yield Models 
 
The effect of positive climate conditions is significant and exhibits the expected quadratic 
form, so that at some point there are diminishing returns from heat and moisture availability. In 
terms of management practices, growing the same crop two years in a row has a significant yield 
depressing effect on the second year crop for all crops except canola. For example, yields decline 
by 0.2 bu/ac for barley and by 10 bu/ac for oats. The impact of cultivating a legume crop the year 
before had a positive but insignificant impact on subsequent yields of wheat, canola and barley. 
Inorganic nitrogen application had a significant productivity impact on flax and canola, while the 
quadratic term (squared term) was negative for most crops indicating a detrimental effect from 
over use.  The reason for the negative and significant coefficient on phosphorous for the barley 
equation is not clear. Zero tillage has a positive impact on wheat and barley yields, but a negative 
impact on the yields of other crops. 
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Crop Production Cost Model 
 
Costs of production for each field in the historical data set were calculated using MAFRI 
budgets for the year 2004. Two adjustments to MAFRI budgets were made. First since we had 
actual values for fertilizer use by farmers of the STC, we replaced the MAFRI estimates with 
actual fertilizer use and multiplied them by MAFRI (2004a) fertilizer prices. Secondly, since 
MAFRI did not distinguish between conventional tillage and zero tillage, tillage costs for zero 
and conventional till were adjusted using with SAF 2004 budgets which are presented in Table 8. 
  

























Herbicides  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.5  6.81  6.54  2.7 
Fuel and oil  -2.7  -2.7  -2.7  -2.7  -2.7  -6.49  -5.58 
Machinery 
repair 
-1.15  -1.15  -1.15  -1.38  -1.15  -3.4  -3.09 
Operating 
interest 
0  0  0  0  0  0  -0.19 





-3.52  -3.52  -3.52  -3.52  -3.52  -5.45  -0.07 
Unpaid labour  0  0  0  0  0  -2.93  -2.93 
Total difference  -3.87  -3.87  -3.87  -4.1  -0.56  -13.45  -10.7 
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Herbicide costs increased by $6.81/acre for canola and by $3.50/acre for the other four 
crops. Fuel costs decreased by $2.70/acre for all five crops. Machinery repair decreased by 
$1.15/acre for all five crops. Machinery depreciation and interest on investment declined by $/ac 
3.52 for all five crops. Hired labour was assumed to remain constant under both cropping 
systems. Total savings for canola were $0.56/acre; $4.10/acre for flax and for the other three 
crops were $3.87/acre. 
 
In order to generate hypothetical costs from alternative crop rotation scenarios for each 
field it was necessary to develop a regression model for cost estimates for each crop type that 
could then be projected back into each field. A simple regression model was estimated similar to 
the yield model in Equation (1).  This equation was: 




6 2 5 1 4 3 2 1
j
j j i D NoTill SC SC P N c      (2) 
Where ci = production cost for crop i (dollars per acre), N and P = total nitrogen and 
phosphorous applied (kg/ha/year), SC1 and SC2 are soil class type dummy variables for Regosols 
and Brunisols respectively, No Till = dummy variable = 1 if no till, and Dj = producer dummy 
variables to capture management effects. 
 
The resulting parameter estimates for crop production costs are shown in Table 9. The 
constant shows the cost of production for conventional tillage for each crop when fertilizer cost 
is excluded. The coefficients for fertilizer are positive and significant. No-till increases the costs 
of production, significantly for wheat, and insignificantly for canola, barley, and flax. Zero till 
reduces costs for oats but the parameter is not statistically significant. The increased costs are 
most likely due to greater fertilizer applications under zero tillage.   
 
Table 9. Parameter estimates from the production cost model.  
 
Variable/ Coefficient  Wheat  Canola  Barley  Flax  Oats 
Constant  125.196**  171.847**  124.397**  120.491**  113.393** 
N  0.445**  0.369**  0.385**  0.276**  0.289** 
P  -0.162**  0.555**  -0.528**  0.625  -0.139 
No-till  5.570**  10.669  5.594  3.254  -8.544   49 
SC1 (Regosol)  7.771**  3.123      8.748 
SC2 (Brunisol)      0.221  -0.290   
Prod_2  -12.225**  -28.413**  20.255**  3.923**  13.125** 
Prod_4  -30.084**    2.461    -2.463 
Prod_5  -26.108**      -21.375   
Prod_8  -1.258  -36.683    -1.345   
Prod_9  5.937  -32.789  12.311     
Prod_10  -3.379    -4.518     
Prod_11  -26.220**  -62.558       
Prod_12  -12.358**  -48.682    2.863   
Prod_13  -33.541**  -59.383       
Prod_14  -6.670  -36.781    -2.553  13.597 
Prod_15  -26.278**  -45.703    -5.615   
Prod_16  -10.178**  -36.547  -2.999  34.159  2.586 
Prod_17  -4.585    20.914**  5.796  9.973 
Prod_18  27.091**  0.752**  28.828**     
Prod_21  17.649**  3.102      32.133** 
Prod_22  28.846**        19.249** 
Prod_24  -7.351  -35.925**  -32.682**  18.672**  37.673** 
Prod_25  -14.085**  -22.976  0.327  -22.475   
Prod_26  -17.675**    0.305    -0.644 
Prod_27  -17.863**  -38.776  -5.354     
Prod_28  1.259  -27.019    7.686  -15.500 
Prod_29  -24.599**  -40.140  -6.941     
Prod_31  -23.189**  -62.103  -13.125  -6.953   
Prod_32  8.988**  -25.009  -1.511  10.301  17.217** 
Prod_33  4.591  -17.023  14.625**  -8.528  1.663 
Prod_34  -17.799**  -53.460  8.983  -10.727  -11.249** 
Prod_35  -19.086**  -37.827  1.751  -13.484  3.314 
Prod_36  -5.468  -24.942    -11.150  33.338** 
Prod_37  -15.631**  -66.390    -18.736   
Prod_38  -18.948**  -69.745    -18.664   
Prod_39  -2.032  -35.507  25.341**  5.983  5.240 
Prod_40  -6.098  -29.437  -10.269  8.042  7.909 
Prod_41  8.770**  -15.536  4.037  14.440  14.413** 
Prod_42  -13.719**  -44.079  -3.532  -8.140  -18.581** 
Prod_43  -30.328**  -59.692      4.517 
Prod_44  16.402  -0.429**  28.544**  31.225   
Prod_45  15.058  -27.737  -7.590     
Prod_46  -15.197**         
Prod_47  13.652**  -13.686  9.584  -8.252**  29.935** 
Prod_48  -33.350**  -61.087       
Prod_49  -1.706  -29.187  26.392**  12.701**  10.075** 
Prod_50  -12.859**  -34.247  6.348  -0.718  -2.647 
Prod_51  20.622**  -4.016**  32.770**    27.092**   50 
Prod_52  0.059  -36.605  17.893**  -1.204  7.658 
Prod_53  -9.950**  -41.122    -4.950  4.970 
Prod_54  -6.989  -25.174      17.302** 
Prod_55  -27.362        -21.634 
Prod_56  -14.335**        -19.874 
Prod_57  -33.336**  -64.810  -23.497     
Prod_58          24.742** 
Prod_59    -62.809  -9.965  -6.526   
Prod_60  -16.343**  -59.342    -12.978   
Prod_61  -21.417**    -9.437  -20.265   
Prod_62  -6.963  -31.799       
R
2   0.585  0.569  0.712  0.417  0.589 
Number of obs.  1,534  893  422  413  290 
** signifies P<0.10 
Forage Income Model 
 
Figure 6 below describes stages in estimating the income to be applied to the forage BMP model. 
The opportunity costs of producing forage on a given field are equal to the lost farm income 
from producing the next best crop; which in turn is derived from the baseline crop rotation model 
developed above.
16 Econometric models were developed to generate equations for projecting 
forage yields and costs on to each field in the 2007-2018 period. Forage yield and cost functions 
were estimated using Equations 3 and 4 respectively: 
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Where  m  =  revenue  from  forage  sales  ($/ac),  n  =  cost  from  forage  production  ($/ac).  β1  = 
Constant, GS/GDD = weather variable, Cattle = 1 if producer owns cattle in 2007, Time = the 
age of the forage stand (years), STi = Soil texture dummy variables for clay, loam and alluvium, 
respectively, and Slope = 1 if slope is greater than 5%, 0 otherwise. 
                                                 
16 Each year a field was in forage the opportunity cost was assumed to equal the mean annual farm income under the 
baseline rotation from 2007-2018.  In addition, to be comparable, the opportunity costs of forage include only the 
variable costs portion of crop production costs. The fixed costs for crop production that were excluded were 





Figure 6.  A diagram showing the calculation of forage conversion costs. 
 
  Forage revenue (in $/ac) was calculated multiplying yield (in t/ac) by 10-year average 
price
 17 Costs (in $/ac) included variable costs for the year 2004 from MAFRI (2004b).
 18 The 
variable Cattle indicates if the producer owned cattle.
19 The Time variable indicates continuous 
years of forage. Soil textural classes include loam, clay and alluvial and were obtained from the 
National Soils Database. Slope is a dummy variable showing whether the slope was greater than 




                                                 
17 Based on personal communication with Sumach (2007), an average price of $59 / t between years 1994 through 
2003 was obtained. 
18 The costs included seeding, pesticides, fertilizer, fuel, repairs, interest on capital,  insurance and taxes. 
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Discussion of Forage Cost and Income Models 
 
The regression models for forage crop revenues and costs are shown in Table below. As 
expected forage income increased with time, but the negative squared term shows that at some 
point there are diminishing returns.
20 The weather variable had an unexpected negative (but 
insignificant) influence on income – possibly because more precipitation would water-log fields. 
All three soil types had positive influences on income, with alluvium being most significant
21. 
Owning cattle significantly improved income as grazing cattle return nutrients to soil. Terrain 
with a slope >5% also has a positive effect on income – possibly because soil is less likely to be 
water logged.  
 
  Forage costs decline with time, possibly because of reduced use of fertilizer over time, 
although the temporal decline in fertilizer use was not statistically significant. The significant 
squared term shows that these costs fall over time at a decreasing rate. The weather variable is 
also weakly associated with reduced costs, as are the variables for clay and alluvial soils, while 
loamy soils are associated with increasing costs. The reasons behind there findings are not quite 
clear. Cattle had no significant effect on costs. Parcels with grade seem to reduce costs, again 
possibly because they do not water-log and experience less nutrient leaching. 
 
Table 10. Results of OLS regression models for forage income and costs. 
 




















                                                 
20 Forage specialists suggest that yield, and hence revenue, peaks between the four to five year stage after which it 
declines. Then, the forage stand is re-seeded after seven to 10 years. 
21 Alluvium includes soil particles of flood plain deposits on low lying areas. Clay has greater moisture and nutrient 
holding capacity, but becomes water logged and difficult to work with.  Loam has a high composition of silt, clay 
and sandy textures and is suitable for horticulture crops (USASK, 2007).    53 




















Number of observations  1105  1105 
Note: ** represents statistically significant at P<.10 level; * represents statistically 
significant at P<0.20 level. Standard errors are in parentheses 
 
An indirect benefit of forage production is the fertilization effect on subsequent crops. 
We estimate this yield boost due to forage using Equation 5 below: 
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Where, ΔYi = Change in crop yield after cultivating forage (in bu/ac), η1 = constant,   
ΔN = change in nitrogen fertilizer applied after cultivating forage (lbs/ac), ΔP = change in 
phosphorus fertilizer applied after cultivating forage (in lbs/ac), and Sli = slope dummy variables 
for 0- 5%, 6- 9%, and 10- 15%, classes, respectively. 
 
  The change in yield (measured in bu/ac) was estimated for wheat and canola (i.e., i = 1, 
2) after cultivating forage. The change in N and P was measured in lbs per acre. The other 
variables have been described before. The results of the model are shown in Table. The model 
was expected to produce a positive shift in crop yield (constant), but showed an insignificant 
negative constant
22.  The weather variable was positive and significant for canola (but not 
wheat). It may be that an increase in water supply to demand ratio improved subsequent canola 
yields.  
                                                 
22 A possible reason for the negative constant (intercept) could be that subsequent crop yields were influenced by 
factors not considered, like pests for example. As well, crop yields may not change significantly without adding 
more nutrients.   54 
 
Increased use of N fertilizer (significantly), and P fertilizer (insignificantly), enhanced 
both wheat and canola yields. An additional pound of N increased wheat and canola yields by 
approximately, 0.5 bu/ac, and 0.3 bu/ac, respectively.  Further comparison of fertilizer use on 
wheat and canola (cultivated after forage) shows that on average, fertilizer application after 
forages increases by about 3lbs/ac. However, when this 3lb increase was multiplied by the 
estimated yield enhancing coefficients (0.5 and 0.3 bu/ac), wheat and canola yields increased by 
1.5 lbs/ac and 0.9 lbs/ac ( relative to pre-forage yields)  respectively. The product of these yield 
increases by wheat and canola prices
23 ($4/bu and $7.50/bu, respectively), gives additional 
revenue of $6/ac and $6.80/ac respectively
24. The product of fertilizer use increase (3lbs/ac) and 
fertilizer price (0.3$/lb MAFRI, 2004b) gave us additional costs of $0.9/ac. Therefore, we 
conclude that the benefits of forage to subsequent crops are due to increased productivity of N 
applications after the forages are removed. 
 
Table 11. The impacts of growing forage in previous periods on cereal and oilseed crops. 
 
Variable  Wheat yield difference  Canola yield difference 




































                                                 
23 10-year average prices from MAFRI (2004). 
24 Extending such benefits of wheat to the other three cereals, and of canola to flax, the additional revenues are; 
$3.6/ac, $2.5/ac, and $6.8/ac, for barley, oats, and flax respectively. These benefits are rather conservative compared 
with literature on yield boosting estimates from forage conversion.   55 
















Number of observations  35  20 
R
2  0.363  0.756 
Note: ** represents significance at P<0.10 level; standard errors are in parenthesis. 
 
The costs of adopting the forage BMP were calculated by projecting a forage rotation 
onto each field using the projection formula developed under the rules for future crop rotations. 
In particular, if no forages were planted on the field, a forage rotation is started in 2007, 
continues for 7 years, and is then followed by a 4 year cereal/oilseed rotation. Similarly, if 
forages were in place in 2007, they are assumed to continue until 7 years are completed then 
followed by a cereal/oilseed rotation.  
 
Estimation of Pasture Costs and Revenue 
 
Finally, fields that are in pasture were assumed to remain in pasture permanently. The net 
benefits of pasture are calculated and added to the forage BMP. Pasture costs were based on 
estimates from MAFRI 2007.
25 Pasture revenue was estimated by multiplying the number of 
animals the pasture could carry by the maximum number of days the pasture could be grazed.
26 
Using information specific to STC we assumed a fertilized pasture could carry 0.25 animals per 
ac, for 120 days, at a rate of $1.10 per day.
27 This provides $33/ac for the entire grazing season. 
For an un-fertilized pasture, we assumed it would carry 0.27 animals per acre for 90 days, at a 
rate of $0.75 per day. This would provide $18/ac for the season.
28  
 
                                                 
25 Costs include land development, herbicide, fertilizer, fuel and repairs, interest on capital, land taxes and labor 
costs.   
26 A 1,000 lb cow with a suckling calf at her side is referred to as one animal unit. 
27 Based on personal communication with J. Thorton, MAFRI, August 22, 2007. 
28 This method assumes greater involvement by the land owner, using their own labor and management skills to 
graze the pasture with cattle that have been leased out to him/her. It assumes greater risk and return, than merely 
renting out the pasture. It is referred to as custom grazing.   56 
Crop Production and Opportunity Cost Projections 
 
The crop rotation rules developed in Step 1were used to project baseline crop types for 
each field from 2007-2018. The regression models for costs and yields (estimated equations 1-4) 
were used to project baseline opportunity costs for each field under the assigned baseline rotation 
assuming conventional tillage (i.e. the No Till dummy variable was set to 0 for each field). In 
order to examine the impacts of zero-tillage on farm income a similar projection was run 
assuming all crops on all fields were cultivated using zero tillage (i.e. the No Till dummy 
variable was set to 1). Similarly, to assess the impact of forage conversion a projection which 
assumed all fields are converted to forage rotation was imposed. For all projections, the weather 
variable (GS/GDD) was assumed to be constant and based on the average GS/GDD for the field 
over the period 1991-2006. Similarly, N and P applications were based on average historic 
inorganic N and P applications for each individual field and crop. There were no stochastic 
elements in these projections. The opportunity cost model was used to determine the net 12-year 
non-discounted cost associated with each BMP for each field.
29 Costs were then aggregated to 
the producer level.  
                                                 
29 Note that we did not discount the costs because the discount factor interacts with the experimental setting.   57 
Analysis of On-Farm BMP Costs 
 
The costs of adopting BMPs were assessed for zero tillage, riparian management, forage 
conversion and holding ponds. Specific assumptions for costing each BMP are presented in each 
section below. 
  
The Zero Tillage BMP 
 
Table 12 summarizes the average impact of zero tillage on farm income for all crops. 
Only wheat and barley yield estimates increased due to zero tillage adoption (between 4.76 bu/ac 
and 2.28 bu/ac respectively). The other crops had estimated yield declines (from -2.55 bu/ac for 
flax and -20.22 bu/ac for oats).  These declines signify revenue losses to the producer. Costs 
increased for all crops except for oats. For wheat the net result is an increase in net income of 
$13.47/acre. However, for the other crops, the cost increases outweighed any yield gains from 
zero tillage. The results suggest that unless the area cultivated with wheat is large enough to 
compensate for losses to the other four crops, there will be an average net cost to the producer of 
adopting zero tillage as a BMP in this watershed. 
 
Table 12. The impacts of adopting zero-tillage on farm income by crop in South Tobacco Creek, 
Manitoba. 
 















Wheat  4.76**  4.00  19.040  5.570**  13.47 
Barley  2.28  2.40  5.472  5.594  -0.12 
Oats  -20.42**  1.65  -33.693  -8.544  -25.15 
Flax  -2.55  7.50  -19.125  3.254  -22.38 
Canola  -5.51**  7.50  -41.325  10.669**  -51.99 
 
The zero tillage BMP cost curve was derived by plotting the 12-year cumulative BMP 
cost against cumulative acres starting with the least expensive on a per acre basis (see Figures 7 
and 8).  Each point in the curves identifies an individual producer in the watershed.    58 
 
Figure 7.  The total cost function for adopting zero tillage for the 36 producers in South 
Tobacco Creek, Manitoba. 
 
 
Figure 8. The marginal costs for adopting zero tillage for the 36 producers in South 
Tobacco Creek, Manitoba. 
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Zero tillage is often seen as a cost effective BMP. Our results, however, show that a 
policy directed at increasing the extent of adoption of zero tillage will be costly (Fig. 7). Over the 
12 year horizon in the cost projection model, adopting zero tillage ranges from a benefit of 
$8.19/ac/12 years (approximately $0.70/ac/yr) to a cost of $170.39/ac/12 years (approximately 
$14.20/ac/yr).  Zero till seems to benefit only two producers; all the other producers experience a 
reduction in net income.  The zero-tillage marginal cost curve (Fig. 8) is an upward sloping 
convex curve exhibiting the desired properties of increasing marginal costs as less suitable lands 
are brought under conservation tillage. Note that the two producers who would enjoy increased 
revenues as a result of adopting this BMP exhibit negative marginal costs in Figure 8. 
 
The regression results as well as personal communication with several producers in the 
watershed suggest that the agro-environmental context plays a large role in determining adoption 
of this BMP. In fact, zero tillage is not widely adopted in the STC watershed, and where it is 
being applied experimentally, producers indicated during an informal discussion that they would 
likely be abandoning the practice once the experiment was over. Reasons given included 
increased labor costs associated with moving equipment in poorly drained sites during planting 
season, and the need for larger farm sizes in order to reduce the average cost of equipment. 
 
The Riparian Area Management BMP 
 
Only six producers have riparian areas that could be brought into a riparian management 
BMP in STC.
30 Riparian management consists of costs of off-site watering of livestock, costs of 
fencing to keep livestock out of riparian areas, and opportunity costs of lost crop production in 
the riparian area.
31  The length of fence required was assumed to be equal to the perimeter of the 
riparian area. The cost per unit length of fence was assumed to be $2.11 per meter based on 
MAFRI (2007) cost of production estimates. An annual fencing maintenance cost of 2% per 
meter was assumed. Off-site water trough costs were obtained from MAFRI (2007) budgets. The 
costs were assumed to be $4000 per 150 cows, or $26.67 per cow. An annual trough 
                                                 
30 Areas eligible for riparian area management were provided by Wanhong Yang (personal communication, 
September 2007). 
31 We assume that the riparian area is converted to natural vegetation in all cases, although it is possible that some of 
the area might be converted to forage instead.   60 
maintenance cost of 2% was also applied. Finally the opportunity cost of lost crop income from 
the riparian area was calculated using the opportunity cost model. The riparian area was assumed 
to be as productive as the rest of the producer‟s fields. The opportunity cost is then equal to the 
average annual net cash income lost from not being able to grow the baseline crops under 
conventional tillage.  
 
 
Figure 9. The total cost function for adopting riparian area management for the 6 producers in 
South Tobacco Creek, Manitoba. 
 
The aggregated and 10-year BMP cost of each riparian area is shown in Figure 9. The 
graph shows the costs of increasing the number of areas under riparian management increases 
linearly, suggesting that fencing costs and off-site watering costs overwhelm the variability 
associated with lost farm income from not cropping the riparian area. The costs range from 
$16,603/field/10years for a 16 acre field to $98,000/field/10years for a 100 acre field. The linear 
shape of the cost function suggests that there is little heterogeneity between producers. The lack 
of heterogeneity suggests that riparian management is not a good candidate BMP for using an 
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auction or price discovery mechanism. Instead payments based on observable fencing and 
watering trough costs should probably be considered. 
 
The Forage Conversion BMP 
 
Forage BMP adoption costs were assessed by converting fields not in a forage rotation to 
a forage rotation starting in the year 2007-2018. The regression models were used to project 
direct forage costs and revenues for the years the fields would be in forage, as well as yield 
boosts for crop rotations following after forage from 2007-18.  The opportunity cost model was 
used to project lost income from the next best alternative crop. 
 
Cost functions for the forage BMP are illustrated in Figures 10 and 11. This forage BMP 
is costly for every producer except one, with costs ranging from $7/acre/10 years to $608/acre/10 
years. The cost relationships are similar in shape to the zero-tillage BMP in that it exhibits 
increasing marginal costs.  Note however, that there is a large difference in the magnitude of 
costs under these two BMPs – enrolling all fields in forage costs over $2.5 million relative to 
approximately $1.6 million to convert all fields to zero tillage. This emphasizes the fact that the 
most cost effective pollution abatement strategy will depend on the relative environmental 
benefits generated by each of these practices. 
   62 
 
Figure 10. The total cost function for adopting the forage conversion BMP for the 
36 producers in South Tobacco Creek, Manitoba. 
 
 
Figure 11. The marginal cost curve for adopting the forage conversion BMP for 36 
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The Holding Pond BMP 
  The estimation of the costs of constructing holding ponds started with identifying all the 
producers who held livestock in 2006. Based on discussions with AAFC staff it was determined 
that 12 producers had livestock and could consider adopting the holding pond BMP.  The cattle 
yards for these producers were located in a GIS and suitable locations for the holding pond sites 
were identified based on drainage areas.  This permitted the estimation of runoff quantities and 
this information along with the number of head of livestock determined the required volume of 
excavation of the holding pond.  These estimates, derived by Jim Yarotski and colleagues, 
ranged from 41 to 3692 m
3 with an average volume of 1374.12 m
3. 
Once each volume was determined, we developed an estimate of the cost per cubic metre 
to excavate the pond using information from the costs of the one existing holding pond 
constructed with assistance of AAFC staff on the Steppler Farm.  This holding pond was 1750 
m
3 and cost $11,935.63 to construct; which yielded an estimated $6.82/m3 for holding pond 
construction.  
We note that in our cost estimates we omitted the costs associated with the annual 
removal of water and associated nutrients and other water borne material from these ponds.  This 
may be a significant expense to producers (Turner, 2008). Little research to date has been 
conducted in methods that could be used to deal with this removal, so we left this cost out of our 
estimates.  Despite its possible economic significance, however, we note that this extra cost 
would be a function of the volume of each pond and its inclusion in the total cost function would 
only serve to shift the cost function upwards in a similar manner for each producer. Thus, the 
relative differences in the costs of the ponds would be the same with and without water removal 
costs. 
 
  Figure 12 displays the total cost function for adopting the holding pond BMP for the 12 
producers in STC. This function clearly identifies two groups of producers – one consisting of 
six “low-cost” adopters and another group of six “high-cost” producers.  These two groups are 
also identified in the marginal cost function (Figure 13) which displays the cost per head 
associated with the adoption of this BMP by the 12 relevant producers. 
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Figure 12. The total cost function for adopting the holding pond BMP for 12 
producers in South Tobacco Creek, Manitoba. 
 
 
Figure 13. The marginal cost function for adopting the holding pond BMP for 12 
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Discussion 
 
  These estimated adoption cost functions are among the first we have seen at the 
watershed level in Canada for BMPs.  Each of these cost functions can be used in different 
policy scenarios.  For example, the total cost functions examine the total costs of adoption in this 
Manitoba watershed and identify where each producer lies on the curve.  Thus, for the holding 
pond BMP the cheapest pond is associated with the producer closest to the origin of the graph. 
Given any fixed incentive budget that is intended to meet the full costs of adoption for each 
producer should start with the most inexpensive producer and work up to more expensive ones 
until the total incentive payments equal the existing budget.  We note that for this BMP, the first 
6 producers would require a total payment of close to $20,000 to fully cover the costs of 
excavation.  
 
  The marginal cost functions denote the economic supply relationships inherent in these 
BMPs.  In essence these cost functions estimate the costs borne by producers to supply the public 
with BMP “services”.  The information presented above, however, conducts this supply analysis 
using the unit of agricultural production (acres or head of livestock).  While these relationships 
may be interesting it must be pointed out that the underlying reasons for the public to provide 
incentives for producers to adopt these practices is to reduce pollution associated with 
agricultural practices.  Whether the costs per unit of agricultural production match with the 
supply of pollution abatement services is an open question to which we now turn.  
   66 
Watershed Level Cost Relationships 
 
The main disadvantage of performance based policy design is that it is difficult to know 
the environmental benefit a BMP will have on a specific parcel of land unless spatially explicit 
analysis had been conducted ex-ante. This has made it more convenient to use practice based 
policy instruments. Spatial targeting of agri-environment policy can tie practices to 
environmental improvements and therefore improve the cost-effectiveness of an agri-
envrionmental payments program. For example, Westra (2003) used a complex integrated 
environmental-economic model to capture the heterogeneity of agricultural systems and regional 
differences within a watershed. The analysis concluded that significant cost-savings can be 
achieved in reducing non-point pollution by targeting BMPs to specific regions of a watershed. 
Eigenraam et al. (2007) also develop a model to identify the environmental benefits of BMPs on 
specific parcels of land for their Eco-Tender pilot program in Australia. 
 
We were able to conduct preliminary analysis of abatement costs for the holding pond 
BMP.  These were based upon linking the holding pond locations with the hydrologic model for 
South Tobacco Creek developed by Dr. Yang‟s research group at University of Guelph. This 
hydrologic model develops estimates of abatement of phosphorus, nitrogen and sediment from 
the cattle yard runoff for each producer.  The procedures used to develop the abatement cost 
function for this BMP are similar to those described above.  The cost per kg abated for each 
pollutant was estimated, and functions were developed starting with the cheapest per kg 
abatement level followed by the next and so on. 
 
Typically, these abatement cost functions are developed using an environmental benefits 
index approach (EBI).  This index allows researchers to include all sources of pollution or other 
environmental services in one metric.  Essentially the pollutants must be weighted according to 
their relative importance as an externality.  In discussions with Jim Yarotski and other WEBs 
managers, it was pointed our that phosphorus abatement is of high interest in Manitoba due to 
excessive nutrients being added to Lake Winnipeg from agricultural production in various 
watersheds and also from other sectors such as municipal wastes. Further communication with   67 
experts from Environment Canada (Dr. Jane Elliot
32) yielded a suggestion that for the province 
of Manitoba the relative importance as a percentage for each pollutant as an impact was 
phosphorus 45%, nitrogen 35% and sediment reduction 20%. In other words phosphorus 
reduction is of the highest importance, followed by nitrogen, then sediment.  Dr. Elliot also 
suggested secondary weighting criteria that could be considered because the three pollutants are 
found in different relative concentrations in the environment. This would suggest that the 
amounts required to have an impact on the environment varies. She used water monitoring 
data from 1993 to 2001 in South Tobacco Creek to propose that reducing phosphorus by 1 kg 
one must reduce nitrogen by 5 kg and sediment by 150 kg.  
 
This information is provided in this report to show that the construction of an EBI in the 
STC watershed seems to be possible, but that water quality experts must be engaged in this 
exercise.  We add that other environmental services could be considered, such as wildlife or fish 
habitat.  This could be important, for example, with the riparian area management BMP and 
other BMPs involving wetlands. We point out that in economic considerations of BMP adoption 
and possible incentives, it is important to include all of the possible environmental services 
provided by adoption of BMPs. 
 
In the case of holding ponds in this study the hydrologic estimates of abatement of the 
three pollutants suggested that their levels of reduction were close to being linear transformations 
of each other. Thus, considering phosphorus reduction alone also achieves similar relative 
abatements levels of nitrogen and sediment in the watershed.   
 
We develop this abatement cost relationship for phosphorus only in Figure 14. It is 
noteworthy that in comparison to the marginal cost curve for livestock (Fig. 13), the pattern of 
producers along the curve is quite different. There is a marked difference in the dispersion of 
producers along the curve in Figure 13 when compared to the curve in Figure 13. This is a result 
of differences in drainage runoff as well as livestock numbers. The result of this is a greater 
degree of heterogeneity in the costs per unit abatement over the costs per head of livestock. 
                                                 
32 This information arose in email correspondence between Jim Yarotski and Jane Elliot in December 2007 upon 
request of the senior author of this report.   68 
Ignoring this heterogeneity and basing incentive policies on livestock or the total costs of 
adoption, would ignore the important contributions that each producer could make towards 
overall abatement in the watershed.  These contributions are related to the physical features of 
the farm landscape as well as the different production practices and operations on each farm. For 
this BMP the function is quite flat. This suggests that while levels of phosphorus abatement may 
be quite different among the 12 farms, the costs of abating these phosphorus amounts lie in a 
fairly narrow range.  
 
 
Figure 14. The marginal abatement of phosphorus cost function associated with adopting 
the holding pond BMP for 12 producers in South Tobacco Creek, Manitoba. 
 
 
In order to illustrate these features of abatement for holding ponds in the watershed we 
display the phosphorus abatement levels and the cost per unit abatement for each of the 12 
producers in Table 13.  This information clearly shows that the highest abatement level for a 
single producer (ID 50, 19.62kg P) is not the most expensive – rather a holding pond on this 
producer‟s property is the fourth cheapest.  Thus, the distribution of the producers along the 
marginal abatement cost curve (Fig. 14) is completely different than that for the marginal costs 
per head of livestock (Fig. 13). To further suggest the utility of this information, if we had an 
adoption budget of $25,179 to provide incentives to abate phosphorus using this BMP we could 
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not find a combination of producers among the 12 that could collectively abate more than this 
one producer for the same costs. 
 
Unfortunately abatement levels are not available yet for the other BMPs so we cannot 
construct these environmental-economic relationships for zero-till, forage conversion and 
riparian area management.  When this information becomes available these relationships can be 
constructed for each BMP as well as for all four BMPs collectively.  The marginal abatement 
costs functions over all BMPs collectively should be a goal of any future study in this watershed. 
 
Table 13. An illustration of the differences in the costs of phosphorus abatement in 
comparison to other adoption parameters in South Tobacco Creek, Manitoba. 
 
Farm ID  Estimated Cost ($) of 
holding pond construction 
Cost ($) 
/head 
Total P abated 
(kg)/year 
Cost ($) /kg P 
33  6043  147  5.27  1147 
16  2919  31  2.46  1187 
26  3151  25  2.64  1194 
50  25179  53  19.62  1283 
40  8361  123  6.04  1384 
47  423  53  0.3  1410 
49  20951  113  14.07  1489 
4  17439  233  11.19  1558 
62  1282  47  0.71  1806 
58  2435  48  1.33  1831 
43  280  25  0.14  2000 
34  24000  138  10.07  2383 
Total  112462    73.85   
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Adoption of BMPs under Conservation Auction Policies 
 
Greencover and other conservation programs like APF implemented by AAFC 
implement a practice based payment that is essentially a flat payment structure with little room to 
negotiate with landowners over the total amounts payable. While the flat payment structure 
suffers all the disadvantages of the practice based program when constrained by a fixed budget, it 
also has higher adverse selection problems where lands that provide low quality environmental 
benefits drive lands with high quality environmental benefits out of the market.  
 
One choice is to compensate landowners based on the level of the costs they face for 
generating environmental improvements by making them reveal their cost using auctions. 
Compensating them based on costs allows the policy maker to offer farmers the chance to make 
bids on how cost-effectively they can provide a unit of ecological good or service, and use this 
information to select them. Such auctions make allocation of public funds more cost-
effective/efficient. The buyer in these auctions, typically the government, can use indicators of 
the environmental benefits attached to each land (such as in the US CRP or Australian Bush 
Tender) so that the public can purchase environmental goods or pollution abatement from those 
lands that provide the most environmental benefit at the least cost (as budget is usually 
constrained), or the greatest level of mitigation, or provide the land owner with the least 
profit/rent.  
 
The design of efficient auctions typically takes place in laboratories/ auction test beds. 
This approach to design was initially suggested and explored by Charles Plott who used 
economic laboratories to design market based policy instruments for providing rights to private 
firms to use airwaves for personal communication devices such as cell phones (Plott 1994). In an 
environmental context these experiments require information on the distribution of the 
environmental benefits and the costs associated with producing them. The benefits are spatially 
distributed based on geophysical factors like soils, weather, slope and proximity to the 
watershed, while the same factors as well as management choices are factors underpinning cost 
distributions. The cost curves show the combined marginal cost of water quality improvements 
borne by all the producers in the watershed. In reality these costs would not be known by the   71 
buyer/government. However, in an economic experimental laboratory the experimenter can use 
the distribution of on-farm cost estimates to approximate this function. These „actual‟ costs then 
become the baseline used to compare the performance of various policy scenarios that are 
obtained by altering the design features of the contract. This on farm cost study attempts to find 
these „actual‟ costs of the relevant BMPs that become the baseline discussed. 
   
Current policies for adoption of Beneficial Management Practices in STC 
 
  A significant policy contribution to generating environmental improvements in Canada‟s 
agricultural landscapes is the adoption of beneficial management practices.  These BMPs are 
agricultural production practices that “minimize and mitigate impacts and risks to the 
environment, by maintaining or improving the quality of soil, water, air and biodiversity; ensure 
the long term health and sustainability of natural resources used for agricultural production; and 
support the long-term economic and environmental viability of the agriculture industry,” 
(reference)  
Operating through Canada's National Environmental Farm Planning Initiative, the 
National Farm Stewardship Program (NFSP) provides technical and financial assistance to 
producers and land managers to support the adoption of BMPs. In Manitoba the delivery of this 
program is through the Farm Stewardship Association of Manitoba (FSAM). Producers eligible 
for financial support must have an Environmental Farm Plan which is an environmental 
assessment of their farm operation outlining potential risks and benefits of their operation and the 
formation of an action plan to mitigate any associated agri-environmental risks. These EFPs are 
voluntary, anonymous, and in most cases self-administered. While there may be very good 
reasons for volunteerism, anonymity and self administration, these features of the policy has 
made it difficult for researchers to understand the regional needs for uptake of BMPs and the 
actual levels of adoption of individual BMPs in geographic locales (e.g. watersheds).   
This program is essentially a voluntary initiative for the adoption of BMPs.  The eligible 
payments for adoption do not represent the full costs of adoption, but are only partial costs 
ranging from 30-50% up to some maximum amount. As we will show this financial support falls 
short of the estimated costs of adoption for the majority of producers in STC. Thus, given the   72 
government‟s budget for BMP adoption one could expect few producers in STC to adopt BMPs 
and hence access these NFS payments.  
We utilize the NFSP payment amounts for the 36 producers in STC as the budget to be 
used to provide water quality improvement services in the watershed. Given that we are 
examining four BMPs, the associated NFSP BMPs were matched and the potential incentive 
payments were calculated. These BMPs and payments are shown below: 
1.  STC BMP Run-off Holding Pond was deemed similar to the NFSP BMP 5: Farmyard 
Runoff Control.  The payments for eligible producers are 50% cost share to a maximum 
amount of $20,000.  
2.  STC BMP Zero-till was similar to the NFSP BMP 14: Improved Cropping Systems. 
Here the payments are 30% of producer costs up to a maximum amount of $15,000 per 
producer. 
3.  STC BMP Riparian Area Management was similar to the NFSP BMP 10: Riparian 
Area Management. Here the payments are 50% of costs up to a maximum amount of 
$20,000 per producer. 
4.  STC Forage Conversion. This BMP was difficult to match to a NFSP BMP. Hence we 
used the payments from a different program covered under Greencover Canada (see 
http://www.agr.gc.ca/env/greencover-verdir/conv_e.phtml).
33 This payment program involves 
two one-time payments. The first is $20/acre for seeding or planting tame forage or 
trees and signing a Contribution and Land-Use Agreement, or $75 per acre for seeding 
native species and signing a Contribution and Land-Use Agreement. The second 
involves an additional $25/acre payment after perennial cover is established and 
Greencover Canada staff inspects and issues a Certificate of Stand Establishment.  
Utilizing this budgetary information and determining the number of producers in the STC 
watershed that could adopt these BMPs, we developed estimates of the funding available to 
provide financial incentives to these producers.  This information is summarized in Table 14 and 
suggests that the incentive payments are not large enough to provide the funding necessary to 
meet the total costs if every producer in STC adopted one of the four BMPs.  Note that since the 
                                                 
33 Note that this program has since been discontinued.   73 
NFS program only pays a portion of the costs for any one individual producer, based on our 
estimates of the individual producer costs of adoption the funds are not enough to pay for BMP 
adoption for any BMP for any producer in the watershed. Scarcity of financial resources to meet 
producer costs could be one of the reasons why few of the BMPs under examination are adopted 
in this watershed.  
Table 14 . A summary of the number of affected producers in the South Tobacco Creek 
Watershed and estimates of the total costs of adoption and budget available for four beneficial 
management practices. 
 





costs of 100% 













6   $294,884   $100,434  P – 69.9 kg 
N – 275 kg 
Sediment – 55.1 t 
Holding ponds
2  12  $112,462  $56,231 
(~$57/head) 
P –73.85 kg 
N – 416.26 kg 
Sediment – 28.47 t 
Zero-till  36  $1,444,175   $433,253  
(~$94/acre) 
Not yet available 
Forage 
conversion 
36  $2,860,727  $858,218  
(~$62/acre) 
Not yet available 
1 Riparian areas only fall within the farms of 6 producers in the watershed 
2 Only 12 of the 36 producer have livestock in 2006 and would be eligible for constructing a holding pond. 
 
These observations led us to suggest auctions as a potential vehicle to promote BMP 
adoption (see also Weber and Boxall 2007). This policy instrument, as noted above, involves 
taking the existing government NFS budget that would be allocated for NFS payments in STC 
and allows the producers to compete for it in a bidding process. The remainder of this report 
outlines how we set this up in an experimental economics laboratory and provides some of the 
findings of this preliminary research. 
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Examination of the Potential for Auctions to Induce Adoption and Increase Levels of Pollution 
Abatement: The Design of the STC BMP Auctions 
 
In establishing our laboratory auction testbeds we were heavily influenced by the 
research reported by Cason et al. (2003) and Cason and Gangadharan (2005) (hereafter called the 
Cason group) who utilized auctions to examine BMP adoption in watersheds in Australia. 
Similar to this Australian research we utilized students as subjects – in our case from a pool of 
largely undergraduate students recruited from the University of Alberta we created using ORSEE 
software (Greiner 2004).  Each experiment in this current phase of the STC research involved an 
auction for one specific BMP. Since we first had information on the holding pond BMP in the 
initial stages of this research, the experimental design was tailored to study this BMP.  This 
meant that each experiment had 12 subjects as there were 12 producers in STC who should 
consider adopting this BMP. 
 
Subjects made sealed-offers for payments to adopt the holding pond BMP based on 
different costs and qualities. The Cason group‟s research imposed heterogeneity on costs and 
quality by randomly drawing costs and environmental benefits for each BMP (called land use 
change in their research papers) independently for each seller each period.  In this STC research 
we had detailed cost information for each producer in the watershed as discussed above, as well 
as environmental benefit information for each producer with and without BMP adoption. This 
environmental benefit information involved estimates of the abatement of phosphorus, nitrogen 
and sediment generated from the hydrologic model developed by Dr. Wanhong Yang‟s research 
group. This knowledge of the costs and environmental benefits allowed us to exploit the actual 
heterogeneity found in STC across the subjects in the experiment. This is similar in spirit to 
Tisdell‟s (2007) approach of bringing biophysical models into the economic laboratory. Thus, in 
the holding pond experiments each subject represented one of the 12 actual producers in the 
watershed and the farms differed by their associated costs of adoption and pollution abatement 
levels.  
 
 These procedures differed slightly for the other BMP auctions we ran. For forage 
conversion and zero-till essentially all 36 producers in the watershed would be eligible for 
payments under the NFS program. Conducting experiments with 36 subjects would be difficult;   75 
hence we constrained the participation levels in these two BMP auctions to 12 subjects.  To 
capture the heterogeneity in costs among the producers for these two BMPs, we drew farms from 
the 36 to represent the cost functions shown in Figures 6 and 9. Table 15 shows the costs for 
each of the 12 subjects in the three BMP experiments. 
 
Table 15.  A summary of the costs of adoption for each of the three BMPs examined for 12 
representative farms in the experimental economics laboratory. 
 
















1  43  280  25  49  6486  6.2  26  5,736  15.8 
2  26  3,151  25  62  26,031  79.3  52  2,033  40.5 
3  16  2,919  31  51  43,607  115.8  4  11,956  48.5 
4  62  1,282  47  34  93,691  175.0  34  28,505  53.3 
5  58  2,435  48  50  88,164  218.1  44  36,211  69.0 
6  47  423  53  43  9,318  233.8  32  124,591  76.2 
7  50  25,179  53  21  89,384  241.0  24  46,424  82.3 
8  49  20,951  113  16  23,706  273.0  49  98,713  86.0 
9  40  8,361  123  44  210,742  339.4  41  22,978  87.1 
10  34  24,000  138  32  212,355  416.7  47  183,532  105.8 
11  33  6,043  147  36  50,177  474.1  33  155,035  121.9 
12  4  17,439  233  9  18,968  608.5  9  4,107  131.8 
1This relates the costs back to the actual farms in the Deerwood Association data. Note that for zero-till and forage 
conversion these 12 farms are draws from the 36 farms that represent the distribution of costs in the cost functions 
derived in the previous chapter. 
 
An important issue in these experiments is the information about the farms available to 
each subject. Cason et al (2003) found that revealing the levels of the environmental 
improvements associated with each auction participant resulted in offers that misrepresented the 
costs of adoption more for “high quality” (in terms of abatement potential) farms. This resulted 
in lower abatement levels and high seller profits than similar trials in an absence of this 
environmental information. Thus, as with Cason and Gangadharan (2005) we did not reveal 
abatement levels associated with each farm in our experiments. We also did not reveal to our 
subjects any information about other subjects‟ costs.  
 
In the Cason group‟s auctions (and indeed other auctions such as the CRP and 
Bushtender) offers provided by bidders were ranked according to their contribution to improving   76 
environmental quality.  Some of these are measured using indices which assess multiple 
contributions towards environmental improvements and hence the term Environmental Benefits 
Index (EBI) is a common term used to describe the assessments. Thus, a common offer ranking 
approach in these environmental auctions to date has been to maximize EBI (called max EBI 
below).  
 
In our STC auctions we were able to develop estimates of abatement associated with 
adoption of the holding pond BMP at each of the 12 farms.  This information was not available 
for the other BMPs from Dr. Yang‟s hydrologic model. Thus, we were able to follow the max 
EBI offer-ranking strategy with this BMP. However, in this WEBs research we also examined 
two other offer-ranking strategies. The first was to select offers based on a strategy to maximize 
participation of producers in the auction (labeled max participation), or in other words to select 
offers that provide the greatest numbers of winners in the auction. The reason this strategy was 
examined is that participation in farm environmental programs seems to be a commonly reported 
goal in Canadian agri-environmental policy (e.g. Alberta Environmental Farm Plan Company 
2007; and see http://www.agr.gc.ca/acaaf/card/cardsuccessstories_regional_e.html). 
 
The second offer ranking strategy examined involved maximizing the number of head of 
cattle or number of acres included in the adoption of the BMP. This strategy, called max 
coverage, was chosen to see how well it could approximate the abatement levels associated with 
the max EBI approach. Given that a significant level of information and analysis is required to 
develop estimates of pollution abatement for producers in each watershed in Canada, we decided 
to examine a strategy that could approximate the max EBI approach for those watersheds that 
had little hydrologic information. While the max EBI strategy could possibly be the best in terms 
of pollution abatement, we feel that very few watersheds in Canada would have the information 
necessary to attempt this procedure. 
 
  There are two pricing rules typically used in procurement auctions. The most common is 
the discriminative-price auction in which winning bidders receive the value of their actual offers 
as payments. In this pricing format the seller earns no surplus (profits) if he/she submits an offer 
equal to their opportunity costs of adopting the BMP. Thus, there exists an incentive to inflate   77 
their offers above their costs. In formulating their offers, producers would trade off gains from 
winning with an inflated offer to the risks of not winning a contract with an inflated offer (losing 
a contract to a competitor). 
 
  The second pricing rule is the uniform-price auction in which all winners receive the 
same price. Typically this price is determined by the lowest rejected offer. In this pricing 
approach inflating one‟s offer serves to decrease the probability of winning because it does not 
change the payment received.  Thus, there is no tradeoff between winning with an inflated offer 
and losing to a competitor. The draw-back with this pricing rule is that the buyer is guaranteed to 
pay winning producers prices that are higher than their opportunity costs.  
 
  Ferraro (2008) notes that there is not sound theoretical guidance on which pricing rule to 
use and points out that experiments and agent based models have been employed to examine the 
implications of the two rules. McKee and Berrens (2001) and Cason and Gangadharan (2005) 
found that discriminative actions are less costly to the agency than uniform-price auctions for a 
given environmental objective. Others have employed formats that allow learning by bidders and 
have achieved opposite conclusions. Because of the lack of sound guidance in choice of the 
pricing rule, we employed both in our BMP auctions in order to compare outcomes both on 
environmental outcomes and economic efficiency metrics. 
 
  Given the three offer-ranking strategies and the two pricing rules, this leads to a 3 X 2 
experimental design for each auction.  In this initial research we develop auctions for each BMP 
separately. Hence, the full design with one repetition involves six separate experiments or 
treatments.  Since it is difficult to generate sound conclusions from experiments with one 
repetition, we employed multiple repetitions and report measures of central tendency and 
dispersion of offers for each treatment.  
 
  Each experiment involved 12 subjects who submitted sealed offers in each of 15 periods. 
Prior to the beginning of each experiment subjects viewed a Powerpoint presentation which 
outlined the rules and procedures of the auction. Subjects were informed that the experimenter 
purchases the lowest priced items per unit of environmental quality, or head/acres for the max   78 
EBI and max coverage ranking rules respectively.  For the max participation ranking strategy 
subjects were told that the experimenter would order the offers by the total offer price and the 
budget will be spent on offers from the lowest upward until all the funds were spent.   Subjects 
were not allowed to communicate with each other to reduce opportunities for collusion. 
 
  Offers were submitted on computers using the ZTREE experimental economic software 
system (Fischbacher 2007). Subjects could not see other subjects‟ offers (hence sealed offers). 
In each of the 15 periods, the offers were collected by the software system and were sorted and 
ranked according to the ranking strategy employed. Offers were then purchased up until the 
budget was exhausted or the environmental target was reached. Once this was done the results 
were reported to the subjects electronically on their computers. The next period then started. This 
continued until 15 periods had elapsed. These procedures were followed in every experiment 
conducted using the budget based auction goal. 
 
  During the experiments each round was set using the software to be 1 minute.  The 
average length of each session length was approximately 45-50 minutes, including reading the 
instructions and determining payments to each subject. For simplicity the producer revenues and 
costs were presented to the subjects as in smaller scale units so that they could understand their 
take-home payments.  We converted each $1,000 in “real” costs to $1 in the experiment. Thus, 
every additional experimental dollar the subjects' farms generated the student took $0.10 home. 
Subjects earned between $15 - $35 a session, with an average per subject payment of $23. 
 
  In the next section we report results from about 25 experiments. The treatments employed 
in these experiments are summarized in Table 16. Note that given time constraints only two 
replications were possible for most treatments. Thus, the results reported should be treated as 
preliminary. We plan to add more (to a maximum of three) in future research. We also conducted 
other auctions that we do not report results for. These auctions served as pilots to test our 
experimental procedures and the software or involved issues such as computer failures and the 
results had to be discarded.  In all we conducted about 35 experimental auctions, 32 with 
students and 3 with a sample of producers and others in the STC watershed. 
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Table 16. A summary of the experiments conducted using students under various experimental 
design treatments.  
 
Auction Goal  Offer Ranking 
Rule 
Number of sessions 
BMP 
Holding Pond  Zero-till  Forage 
Conversion 






   






  Max EBI  2 Uniform 
2 Discriminative     
Target based  Max 
Participation 
     
  Max Coverage  2 Uniform 
0 Discriminative 
   
  Max EBI   2 Uniform 
2 Discriminative     
 
a Pricing rule treatment where “winning” bidders are paid the amount offered by the highest 
“losing” bidder. 
b Pricing rule treatment where “winning” bidders are paid the amounts they actually offered.  
 
 
Results and Discussion 
Expected Results 
We report results for the experimental auction using several measures.  The first is 
economic efficiency which is the cost of abatement per unit of pollution.  We had information 
for the holding pond BMP so were able to calculate this measure for all treatments employed. 
We could not do this for the zero till and forage conversion BMPs, but hope to in the future.  Dr. 
Yang‟s hydrologic model provided abatement levels of phosphorus, nitrogen and sediment. We 
noted that for the holding pond BMP these pollutants were highly correlated and linearly related. 
So we present the efficiency measures in cost per kg of phosphorus abated since phosphorus is a 
pollutant of significant interest in Manitoba.
34 
  We also report on the efficiency of the auction in terms of the total amount paid to 
winning bidders.  This includes the portion of the budget spent and the amount of total payments 
                                                 
34 This was also mentioned to us in meetings with WEBs management staff in Edmonton in August 2007.   80 
that were greater than costs of adoption for the winners.  We call this surplus over costs rent, as 
this is the term used to describe this in the economic literature.  
  In order to compare auction results we developed a set of “expected” or base-line results 
which essentially rely on the subjects bidding their costs. We utilized a procedure called the 
“greedy algorithm” to develop these expected findings. This approach takes pricing and offer-
ranking rules and selects winners (who bid their costs) in each auction until the budget is 
exhausted. This allows us to determine who “should” win the auction and how much of the 
budget would be spent assuming that subjects submit offers equal to their costs of adoption.  
  Figure 15 summarizes some of these results for the holding pond BMP.  The first 
histogram shows that under the max participation strategy more producers would “win” the 
auction – the max EBI approach would result in fewer winners than either of the other two 
ranking strategies. However, max EBI would be expected to perform the best at phosphorus 
abatement as shown in the second histogram in the top row. The bottom row shows two 
histograms that summarize budget outlays and the portions of this outlay that is expected to be 
rent. The max participation strategy with the uniform price rule has the highest portion of rent. 
Indeed as predicted under the uniform pricing rule, a considerable portion of the total payment 
under any offer-ranking approach examined is rent. Rent is nor predicted to be collected by 
winners under the expected discriminative pricing rule as the greedy algorithm assumes that 
subjects would bid their costs. The experiments will “real” subjects will show whether this 
assumption is realized. 
Experimental Results 
  Tables 17 to 19 display results of the experimental auction along with the expected 
results for the holding pond BMP under the max participation, max coverage and max EBI 
ranking strategies for both pricing rules. Note that in each cell the result represents the average 
result of two trials for each offer-ranking strategy. To facilitate the discussion of this 
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Figure 15.  Summaries of various expected outputs for the holding pond auctions using the greedy algorithm.   82 
Table 17. Results for the holding Pond BMP under the maximum participation of producers offer ranking strategy. 
 




Uniform Payment    Discriminative Payment 
Expected  Experiment Rounds    Expected  Experiment Rounds 
1-5  6-10  11-15    1-5  6-10  11-15 
Number of farms  7  6.7  6.8  7.2    9  5.6  5.0  5.1 
Number of head  359  481  434  450    502  416  337  412 
Budget expended ($)  42,298  50,348  49,914  50,224    42,332  48,063  47,386  50,769 
Rent ($)  25,766  20,441  24,904  21,501    0  20,042  24,621  23,437 
Payment/farm min ($)  6,043  7,581  7,203  6,985    280  3,590  4,918  7,222 
Payment/farm max ($)  6,043  7,581  7,203  6,985    17,439  14,763  12,012  11,371 
Payment/farm average ($)  6,043  7,581  7,203  6,985    4,704  8,704  9,622  9,969 
Payment/head min ($)  48  49  50  49    25  44  73  74 
Payment/head max ($)  755  861  900  873    233  1,183  1,021  817 
Payment/head average ($)  118  125  130  126    84  133  164  156 
Phosphorus abated (kg)  12.85  21.69  17.31  21.36    30.08  20.62  17.30  20.36 
Cost P abated ($/kg)  3,293  2,321  2,883  2,351    1,407  2,331  2,740  2,494 
 
1 Note that each number is the average of two experimental trials.  83 
Table 18. Results for the holding Pond BMP under the maximum coverage of livestock offer ranking strategy. 
 




Uniform Payment    Discriminative Payment 
Expected  Experiment Rounds    Expected  Experiment Rounds 
1-5  6-10  11-15    1-5  6-10  11-15 
Number of farms  6  4.9  6.4  6.6    7  4.3  3.5  4.3 
Number of head  318  572  639  741    793  673  550  510 
Budget expended ($)  16,857  39,899  40,959  46,204    35,689  50,680  36,337  39,569 
Rent ($)  6,368  2,394  1,877  10,059    0  15,289  11,954  17,621 
Payment/farm min ($)  424  2,164  785  518    280  1,756  3,697  1,291 
Payment/farm max ($)  6,732  20,118  20,343  27,812    25,179  33,765  27,861  26,238 
Payment/farm average ($)  2,810  8,609  6,519  7,052    5,096  12,270  11,977  10,515 
Payment/head min ($)  53  74  66  62    25  55  67  68 
Payment/head max ($)  53  74  66  62    53  103  85  81 
Payment/head average ($)  53  74  66  62    45  76  74  77 
Phosphorus abated (kg)  7.58  25.21  25.92  27.79    27.19  27.52  21.26  17.05 
Cost P abated ($/kg)  2,225  1,583  1,580  1,662    1,312  1,842  1,709  2,320 
 
1 Note that each number is the average of two experimental trials.     84 
Table 19. Results for the holding Pond BMP under the maximum abatement of phosphorus offer ranking strategy. 
 




Uniform Payment    Discriminative Payment 
Expected  Experiment Rounds    Expected  Experiment Rounds 
1-5  6-10  11-15    1-5  6-10  11-15 
Number of farms  6  5.0  6.2  6.6    6  4.1  3.6  4.4 
Number of head  813  669  702  795    813  485  601  551 
Budget expended ($)  54,101  43,192  43,711  50,798    46,076  45,663  43,885  48,436 
Rent ($)  8,025  -4,953  2,138  2,025    0  3195  3,634  1,672 
Payment/farm min ($)  454  1,531  209  237    423  2,639  5,991  3,552 
Payment/farm max ($)  29,216  21,615  24,773  26,323    25,179  24,635  28,573  24,770 
Payment/farm average ($)  9,017  9,006  7,440  7,742    7,679  11,858  14,772  12,215 
Payment/head min ($)  31  23  18  20    25  39  40  48 
Payment/head max ($)  191  173  179  183    147  204  188  204 
Payment/head average ($)  67  68  66  65    57  100  79  91 
Phosphorus abated (kg)  36.33  35.04  33.45  36.75    36.33  29.14  31.00  31.61 
Cost P abated ($/kg)  1,489  1,233  1,307  1,382    1,268  1,567  1,416  1,532 
 
1 Note that each number is the average of two experimental trials.  85 
Figure 16 shows the levels of phosphorus abatement for each pricing rule and offer-
ranking strategy. These relationships are plotted relative to their expected abatement 
performance once the BMP was linked to the hydrologic model and abatement levels could be 
assessed for each farm individually.  The figure shows that the predicted abatement amount from 
the experiments for the maximum EBI strategy for both pricing rules lie quite close to the 100% 
level.  Given that abatement levels for the maximum EBI strategy are higher than the other two 
strategies examined (Fig. 15) we suggest that this strategy clearly performs the best in terms of 
overall abatement. The discriminative pricing approach appears to generate slightly reduced 
abatement in comparison to the uniform strategy. This finding is based on two experimental 
trials using each pricing rule, so we are reluctant to draw firm conclusions regarding the prcing 
rule design at this stage of our research.  
The other offer-ranking strategies do not perform as well – in particular the maximum 
participation strategy performs quite poorly under both pricing rules. This coupled with its 
overall lower level of abatement (Fig. 15) suggests that it is not a good candidate for designing 
auctions for pollution abatement. The maximum coverage approach does perform better than the 
participation approach, however, and at this stage should not be removed as a feasible approach 
to auction design in abating non-point source pollutions in agricultural watersheds. 
Figure 16 shows the cost effectiveness of winning offers across the experiments for each 
offer-ranking strategy and pricing rule for the holding pond BMP. In this figure the results are 
presented as a percentage of the expected results – thus any line along the 100% level is 
consistent with the expected cost/kg of P abated. This information in Figure 17 clearly shows the 
most expensive offer-ranking strategy under either pricing rule is maximum participation. The 
maximum EBI strategy lies quite close to the 100% line suggesting that this rule performs in the 
experiments as predicted from our greedy algorithm results. The maximum coverage strategy 
falls between these two ranking strategy relationships, but is closer to the maximum EBI than the 
maximum participation strategy. We conclude from these findings that the maximum 
participation approach to selecting offers is clearly not a cost effective strategy for abating 
pollution in this watershed.  
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Figure 17. A summary of the costs/kg of phosphorus abatement for each pricing rule and offer-ranking strategy for the holding pond 
BMP.
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We were unable to compare all of the holding pond results to the other BMPs because the 
hydrologic model results are not yet available for the other BMPs in STC.  We did examine 
auctions for the adoption of zero till and forage conversion under the maximum coverage 
strategy, however.  These results appear in tabular form in Tables 20 and 21. Some of the 
findings are compared in Figure 18.  The information in Figure 18 suggests that the costs per 
acre contracted through the auction using the uniform pricing rule are greater than the 
discriminative pricing rule.  This observation holds for the zero till and forage conversion BMPs, 
but not necessarily for the holding pond BMP. Although portions of the uniform curve are above 
the discriminative one, this does not appear in every period. We feel that further research is 
required to fully understand the implications of the pricing rules in these BMP auctions.  
 
There are a number of other observations that can be made from the results.  For the 
holding pond BMP, inspection of the data summarized in Table 19 revealed that the levels of 
phosphorus abatement differed between the two pricing rules.  For the maximum coverage 
strategy and the uniform price case we observed that in periods 11-15 27.8 kg of phosphorus was 
removed from the system by the successful bidders. In the discriminative case only 17.5 kg of 
phosphorus was removed. These numbers are smaller than those for the maximum EBI strategy 
where 36.75 kg and 31.61 kg of phosphorus were removed by successful bidders in the uniform 
and discriminative pricing cases respectively. Nonetheless the environmental improvements, 
while greater for the strategy used to generate improvements specifically as expected, were 
larger for the uniform rule than the discriminative rule.  This observation requires further testing 
in the experimental laboratory in the future. 
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Table 20. Results from experimental auctions for the adoption of the zero till BMP under the maximum coverage offer ranking 
strategy. 
 
MAXIMUM COVERAGE OF THE RELEVANT AGRICULTURAL UNIT OF PRODUCTION (ACRES) 
 
Measures 
Uniform Payment    Discriminate Payment 
Expected  Experiment Rounds    Expected  Experiment Rounds 
1-5  6-10  11-15    1-5  6-10  11-15 
Number of farms  4  4.4  4.5  4.9    6  4.5  4.0  4.5 
Number of acres  1,194  1,975  2,074  2,089    3,353  2,752  2,299  2,285 
Budget expended ($)  181,373  148,592  162,123  161,687    209,032  180,168  150,189  170,218 
Rent  133,143  14,710  20,947  38,196    0  1,593  27,397  18,822 
Payment/farm min 
($) 
25,001  10,362  14,166  11,833    2,033  5,688  12,109  6,930 
Payment/farm max 
($) 
82,431  70,764  64,748  58,475    124,591  118,200  102,534  90,788 
Payment/farm 
average ($) 
45,343  35,646  36,309  34,584    34,838  40,347  44,185  38,197 
Payment/acre min ($)  69  74  74  77    15  20  57  68 
Payment/ acre max 
($) 
69  74  74  77    76  80  79  79 
Payment/ acre 
average ($) 
69  74  74  77    62  65  73  75 
Phosphorus abated 
(kg) 
                 
Cost P abated ($/kg)                     90 




MAXIMUM COVERAGE OF THE RELEVANT AGRICULTURAL UNIT OF PRODUCTION (ACRES) 
 
Measures 
Uniform Payment    Discriminate Payment 
Expected  Experiment Rounds    Expected  Experiment Rounds 
1-5  6-10  11-15    1-5  6-10  11-15 
Number of farms  2  2.4  2.9  2.9    5  4.2  3.8  3.2 
Number of acres  1,376  1,443  1,548  1,568    2,692  2,309  2,169  1,889 
Budget expended ($)  159,657  174,368  207,877  200,981    257,980  204,336  216,474  184,152 
Rent ($)  127,140  66,237  117,841  108,176    0  18,852  61,998  64,432 
Payment/farm min 
($) 
38,067  52,374  36,235  34,373    6,486  5,808  8,126  14,126 
Payment/farm max 
($) 
121,590  102,639  121,513  121.008    93,691  105,500  108,600  89,572 
Payment/farm 
average ($) 
79,828  74,424  79,472  70,623    51,595  49,219  58,779  57,435 
Payment/acre min ($)  116  125  133  128    6.2  6  8  13 
Payment/ acre max 
($) 
116  125  133  128    218  220  225  215 
Payment/ acre 
average ($) 
116  125  133  128    95.8  89  103  97 
Phosphorus abated 
(kg) 
                 
Cost P abated ($/kg)                   




Figure 18. Average payments per acre or head under two auction pricing rules for the maximum coverage offer-
ranking strategy for the adoption of three BMPs in experimental economic laboratory settings.  
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Target Based Auctions 
  The results reported above used the NFS budgets as the major constraint in the 
experimental auctions. In reality the conservation agent (e.g. government) has at least two 
options to select as a cut-off point for a conservation auction: budget based as we used above, or 
target based. In the budget based auction, the policy maker sets aside a fixed amount of dollars 
for the given purpose, and the participating landowners‟ offers are ranked and then selected from 
lower offers upward until the entire budget is spent. The advantage of this type of auction is that 
the program‟s cost is well-known in advance, there are no financial surprises and it can be easily 
planned. However, there is uncertainty about the level of environmental quality improvements 
that can be achieved with the budget based approach.  
 
In the target based auction the regulator sets an environmental quality improvement 
target that it wants to achieve. For example, the regulator could want to achieve 30 kg of 
phosphorus abatement or cover 700 head of cattle under some alternative management practice. 
In such an auction the regulator selects the cheapest offers until the target is achieved. The 
advantage of this type of goal setting is that it ensures the required environmental quality 
improvement, but the cost of doing this is uncertain.  
 
In the laboratory we examined the potential difference between the two goal setting 
approaches using the holding pond BMP. First we conducted experiments using a fixed budget 
as described above and developed estimates of the level of phosphorus abatement (see Table 
19). Taking this level of abatement, we then used this level as a target in two subsequent auction 
experiments. Both the maximum coverage and the maximum EBI offer-ranking strategies were 
examined.  
 
The results suggest that the budget based auction can lead to a more cost efficient 
conservation. Figure 19 displays some results of these experiments. The first panel shows that 
for the case of the maximum EBI ranking strategy and uniform pricing rule the budget based 
abatement prices are clearly below the target based prices. Using the maximum coverage   93 
ranking strategy, however, the budget based prices start high, but after several rounds as the 
subjects learn the rules of the auction setting, the budget based auction prices become more cost 
efficient than the target based prices.  In the case of discriminatory pricing, however, the budget 
based auction can lead to higher abatement costs on average than the target based approach 
(Figure 20).  
 
These results are not consistent with those reported by Schilizzi and Latacz-Lohmann 
(2007). They found that the budget based auction outperformed a target based one in a multiple 
round auction setting. Our results suggest that both formats perform relatively the same. They 
claim that by design the target based auction constrains the number of bidders, while the budget 
based one allows more winners to be included resulting in higher-cost participants being 
selected in turn raising the average cost per unit abatement. Once again we feel our results are 
preliminary pending further rounds of experiments to confirm our findings. We do note that with 
15 rounds in our experiments there is potential for participants to learn to “game” the auction. 
This is an observation made by Schilizzi and Latacz-Lohmann (2007) to which we have no reply 
at this point of our research. 
 
A Comparison of Student Participants with Actual Producers 
  We were fortunate to be able to attend the 2008 Annual Meeting of the Deerwood Soil 
and Water Association on March 10, 2008.  At this meeting we were permitted to bring our 
laboratory and host three sessions of experiments with producers and several other participants. 
These sessions were not strictly the same as those we ran at the University of Alberta with 
students as it was impossible to tightly control the conditions – for example the novelty of the 
demonstration did not permit us to enforce a lack of communication. We decided to conduct 10 
rounds per experiment rather than 15.  We also learned that our visual experimental interface on 
the computers was somewhat confusing to the producers.  
 
Nonetheless we conducted three experiments: two maximum EBIs (one uniform and one 
discriminative price) and one maximum coverage (uniform price) auction. The maximum EBI   94 
auctions were conducted first and these served to be learning experiences for the participants – 
they had opportunities to learn how to submit bids and something about the strategies. For these 
reasons we have not analyzed the results and do not wish to draw firm conclusions from them.  
However, the final auction conducted during this meeting we do feel provided some interesting 
results.  
Figure 21 shows that in this maximum coverage approach the prices ($/head) converged 
to the expected $53/head for both the students and the producers. The producers‟ selected 
uniformly priced offers converged to the expected price from below, while the students‟ selected 
offers converged from above.  The similarity in these results is striking, and mirrors some of the 
similar comparative findings emerging from Australian research and those in the US (e.g. 
Cummings et al. (2004). While we are excited by this one experimental result, it is clear that 
further comparisons should be made to “test the testbed” approach using students. 
 




Figure 19.  Results from budget based and target based auctions for two ranking strategies. The 
top panel is for the maximum EBI strategy and the lower panel is for the maximum coverage 
strategy. 
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Figure 20.  The average price of phosphorus abatement from two budget based and two target 
based auctions for the maximum EBI strategy using discriminative pricing.  
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Figure 21. A comparison of the prices derived in the experimental laboratory by student and 
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Conclusions 
The results from the Farm behavior component of the South Tobacco Creek project are 
preliminary, and are currently being refined. Therefore it is difficult to draw generalized 
conclusions at this point. Further experiments are being conducted to complete the data 
collection during FY 08-09 through Interim WEBS funding. Nonetheless, the experiments to 
date have yielded a number of results that are useful from a policy perspective. The main results 
are as follows: 
1.  The four BMPs assessed differ in terms of their cost as well as their ability to deliver 
environmental benefits. Unfortunately, there is no BMP that dominates across farms at all 
abatement levels. Farms have heterogeneous costs in terms of BMPs, so some farms may 
be cost effective at supplying abatement using one BMP, and not another.  
2.  This suggests that if water quality benefits (e.g. phosphorous reduction) can be quantified 
through modeling by BMP and by farm, then water quality should be the contracting unit 
for the auction rather than the BMP. This would allow producers to select the most cost 
effective BMP for supplying water quality benefits, and then decision makers could 
allocate contracts based on ranking the costs of abatement. At the next stage of the 
research we will be testing whether there are synergies between farms – ie., whether the 
joint production function for water quality between farms differs from the sum of 
individual production functions. This will have implications for how the payment scheme 
should be designed. 
3.  Incorporating goals such as maximum participation in conservation auctions is inefficient 
in terms of cost and environmental benefits. If fairness, or using conservation payments 
as a form of extension to learn about on farm costs of BMPs is the goal of the auction, 
then fixed payment programs which are open to everyone may be more desirable. 
4.  The performance of the auction depends on the shape of the cost function for BMPs 
and/or pollution abatement, as well as whether uniform (pay everyone the highest bid) or 
discriminatory pricing (pay everyone their own bid) rules are applied. In future research 
we will be investigating to what extent we can generalize results about the performance 
of uniform versus discriminatory pricing rules in this context. However, an alternative   99 
would be to select the pricing rule based on fairness rather than cost, as has been done in 
other jurisdictions. 
 
In conclusion, this research has allowed us to investigate individually the performance of 
incentive payments for individual BMPs. The results of the analysis provide us with a baseline of 
information by which we can begin to assess more complex conservation program issues, such as 
how to optimally select multiple BMPs within the watershed, and whether/how to spatially target 
BMPs.  
Problems, Lessons Learned and Future Research 
 
We have felt privileged to be able to have conducted this research using some of the 
valuable information available in the watershed.  Indeed, the levels of financial support and the 
participation of colleagues from the government, NGOs and academia has truly been remarkable. 
The literature on the use of auctions to generate environmental improvements is in its infancy 
and has focused largely on comparing the auction approach with fixed price schemes.  These 
fixed price schemes are generally not found in Canada and thus much of this previous research 
we feel has had limited relevance in the Canadian context.  
While our research has been constrained by lack of data and some time considerations 
generated through the government budgetary system, we have still learned a lot. In particular, we 
note that our research is rather preliminary and that further examination of the auction approach 
is worthy of investigation. We briefly summarize some of the specific things we learned and 
some of our research ideas below. 
 
1.  The authors of this report have not been experienced in the use of experimental 
economics as a research technique to understand policy approaches to addressing non-
point source pollution issues. This research has allowed us to examine the technique and 
understand its strengths and weaknesses. As a result of this work we have developed a 
mobile experimental computer laboratory that we tested at the Deerwood annual meeting. 
We think that further experiments with producers need to occur, and having this lab will 
greatly facilitate this endeavor. 
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2.  Our current suite of single BMP tests should be completed. In particular the maximum 
EBI strategy for zero till and forage conversion needs to be completed. This will require 
linkages to the hydrologic model which hopefully will be developed soon. These auctions 
could also include other BMPs that are being examined in other projects such as wetland 
restoration in STC. 
 
3.  Our auctions to date have involved single BMPs. While this is necessary given the 
information we had (i.e. only the holding pond BMPs could be linked to the hydrologic 
model), it is apparent to us that the combined effect of BMPs on producer costs and cost 
effective environmental improvements must be considered in our experiments. In reality 
producers might face a “menu” of BMPs and select one or more from this list given the 
available incentives. We think that our next research steps need to consider this. In order 
for this to occur we first need to develop an overall abatement supply function for the 
STC watershed possibly including even other BMPs such as wetland 
retention/restoration.  
 
4.  Continuing on this vein, given our detailed understanding of adoption costs and the 
hydrologic modeling conducted by Dr. Yang‟s group in STC we think that spatially 
explicit models of BMP adoption should be considered. These models should initially 
perhaps not involve auctions – just spatial targeting initiatives in the watershed. Spatial 
optimization model can be used to develop these targets. In considering auctions in this 
framework, “smart markets” need to be considered in which an optimization model is 
included in each auction round to select winning offers. This will be a challenging 
undertaking because this optimization model will have to operate in the background 
between auction rounds and must operate swiftly so that auction participants do not get 
bored and lose interest during the process. 
 
5.  Our current auction designs have not allowed communication among the players. This is 
obviously an unrealistic situation as producers may collude to “game” the auction.  In 
particular, we need to explore this in the context of a number of the BMPs that could 
require repeated bidding on a quantity basis (e.g. forage conversion whereby producers   101 
choose the number of acres to convert). We think that we need to rerun a smaller subset 
of our completed auctions to date with communication. This will enable us to isolate the 
effect that this has on auction results and performance. 
 
6.  Our current box of policy options to test could include some group incentives.  
Watershed associations are growing in number in Canada and devolving some 
responsibility for pollution abatement to the local level may be worthy of examination. 
We propose to examine group payment strategies and to understand how to develop 
auctions to reduce opportunities for players to collude (or to collude for environmental 
benefit).  This may involve further examination of the target based approach to auctions. 
 
7.  We learned that the experimental interface between the auction and producers needs to be 
significantly different than that we use with students.  In our three trials the producers 
commented that the interface did not feel accurate and that they did not “see a farm” in 
the experiment.  This needs to be addressed if we do further experiments with producers 
instead of students.   102 
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